about a change of regime. Saddam was an affront,
a ruthless dictator. He would finish the business
begun by his father who had allowed Saddam to
remain in power. Transforming Iraq and creating
representative institutions there, would send a
powerful signal throughout the Middle East that
the era of dictators, theocracies and feudal dynas-
ties was passing. If they remained unreformed and
presented a threat, they would know that the US
had the power and the will to act. A more demo-
cratic Middle East would remove regimes spread-
ing hatred against the US. That was the hope and
expectation. The sense of ‘mission’ proved hard
to sustain when confronted with the realities
the occupation faced after the fall of Saddam
Hussein. Bush and Blair recognised that the
Israeli–Palestinian problem could not be allowed
to fester and poison relationships. The Palestinian
authorities would have to eradicate the terrorists
attacking Israel, a condition for Israeli withdrawal
and the creation of a Palestinian state. A stable
Middle East was important for world peace and
for the world economy. It would all be far more
difficult to reach than even the difficult path Bush
and Blair knew lay ahead.
But was war justified in international law? The
affirmative answer to that on strictly legal grounds
proved contentious. Was ‘regime change’ a legiti-
mate aim? It was not a new question. After the
Congress of Vienna in 1815 the continental mon-
archs had wanted to crush revolutions in neigh-
bouring states as a danger to their own stability. In
response, Britain had laid down a ‘doctrine of non-
intervention’; there could be no concerted inter-
ference by a coalition of countries in the internal
affairs of another country unless what was happen-
ing in the country constituted an imminent danger
to its neighbours. On that basis the League of
Nations and the United Nations of Sovereign
States was founded. Pre-emptive attacks are hard
to justify in international conduct and law unless it
can be shown the dangers and threats are immi-
nent. Without evidence of such a danger, however
brutal the regime, in international law, foreign
intervention is not permissible unless authorised by
the UN. But is such an interpretation of law appro-
priate in the twenty-first century? Can a country be
expected to wait until a nuclear weapon has been
built and is ready to be fired from an openly hos-
tile nation? Ought not the gross abuse of human
rights lead to intervention, though the conflict of
national interests at the UN may not always make
it possible to secure UN backing? International
law and coming to the aid of innocent people may
also at times be in conflict. A commission of wise
men appointed by Kofi Annan proposed new
guidelines. The Bush administration would have
preferred to act with the United Nations, but ulti-
mately, when it regarded its national interests
threatened, was not prepared to defer to any inter-
national restraint. International law has limitations
- that reality has been demonstrated time and time
again. The UN has played important roles in inter-
national conflicts but is not the final arbiter in the
real world.
Before dawn on 20 March 2003 the war began
in Iraq with a surprise missile attack on a complex
in Baghdad. Intelligence had reported Saddam
was there. The missile failed to decapitate the
regime. This was followed by more devastating
1
THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 933
Tony Blair, 1997. © Sean Aidan, Eye Ubiquitous/
Corbis
