to develop in the West. Even with the accelera-
tion of historical change since 1945, it will take
time before the Middle East’s cultures are recon-
ciled with democracy and then they will not nec-
essarily follow Western examples. That is what
makes the outcome of the new beginnings in Iraq
so important and fascinating. The West will need
to show understanding and respect.
Syria, like Iran, has supported terrorist groups
against Israel. It, too, is under threat from the
US. The death of Hafez Assad in 2000 ended
three decades of repressive rule in Syria which, at
the height of brutality in 1982, killed 10,000 fun-
damentalist Sunni Muslims threatening Baathist
control. The Assads are members of the minority
Alawite Druze sect, the majority of Syrians are
Sunnis. Hafez Assad designated as his successor
his second-eldest son Bashar, after his older
brother, better trained for the role of autocrat,
died in a car crash. Parliament changed the con-
stitution to allow the dead president’s will to be
done and speedily elected Bashar who had only
returned to Syria six years earlier after the death
of his brother, abandoning his training in London
as an ophthalmologist. The Syrian elite are the
military who had ruled under his father and
wanted no change, and in particular not his uncle
living in exile after a failed coup against his father.
In old age, Hafez Assad had won something of a
place as an elder statesman in the Middle East,
courted by America and Britain to cajole him to
make peace with Israel. Israel was prepared to
return most of the Golan Heights but Assad
would not compromise. His support of Hizbullah
in the Lebanon fighting Israel placed him in line
to join the ‘axis of evil’. Assad was careful to draw
closer to the US, providing intelligence assistance
against al-Qaeda terrorist plans and voting for
Security Resolution 1441. Assad also took care to
avoid a direct confrontation with Israel which he
had no hope of facing alone. The experience of
the 1973 war was enough to convince him of the
futility of armed conflict. What he could not bring
himself to do was to conclude a peace. No peace,
no war and continuing Palestine–Israeli conflict
allow Syria to station troops in the Lebanon.
Another benefit of his stance was for his weak and
poor country with a population of just over 16
million to receive the undiminished attention of
the international community. The state-run
economy is inefficient and the standard of living
dependent on the weather and the price of oil.
The impact of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein
will make Syria even more cautious.
The link between terror, al-Qaeda and bin
Laden pointed to Saudi Arabia. Yet relations
based on oil and the defence of the royal house
which had been close with the US and the West
weakened during the Iraq war, when unlike the
time of the first Gulf War, the Saudi Arabian royal
family gave little support. In 2003, the US with-
drew its large military bases which affronted
Muslim fundamentalists and were one of bin
Laden’s principal targets to attack. Under the
ailing King Fahd, despite promises by crown
prince Abdullah, reform made little progress. The
younger generation with little prospect of gainful
employment is restless, the economy declining
and totally dependent on the fluctuations of the
price of a barrel of oil. With the US bent on
pushing democratic reforms, the royal family itself
is divided on future policies.
The conservative House of Saud, facing the
menace of Nasser’s republican movement seeking
to embrace the Arab world in the 1960s, appeased
the one power in the country that would be able to
rally the people against it, the Wahabi clerics who
guard the two holiest shrines in the Muslim world.
The clerical establishment is vehemently anti-
Western, its religious teaching became a breeding
ground for Muslim fundamentalism, Osama bin
Laden was one of its pupils. Before 1993, when
global terrorism first began to take hold with the
activities of al-Qaeda, the US and the West paid lit-
tle attention to the growing popular dissent with
the royal ‘family’ whose hundreds of princes
monopolise positions in the state and live in opu-
lent luxury. It was quickly noted that Osama bin
Laden was the son of a wealthy businessman in
Saudi Arabia, a contractor and friend of the king.
Although he had left Saudi Arabia and established
his base first in Sudan and then in Afghanistan,
the links with Saudi Arabia remained strong. Al-
Qaeda receives money from Saudi Arabian private
individuals and members of the ‘family’ all closely
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