years, after which the island would be occupied by Russia. Naturally
Whitworth turned this down, for London was set on war, and added
fresh conditions to his original demand for a ten-year tenure of Malta.
On I I May Napoleon wearily addressed another meeting of the
Council of State in St-Cloud. The latest terms, he told them, were
that Britain should occupy Malta for ten years, and in addition possess
the island of Lampedusa in perpetuity; France meanwhile was to
withdraw from Holland within a month. Even the most purblind pacifist
could now see that Napoleon was right: there would never be any end of
new British terms and conditions. As he rightly said: 'If the First Consul
was cowardly enough to make such a patched-up peace with England, he
would be disowned by the nation.' The Council enthusiastically voted to
insist on the original terms of the Treaty of Amiens.
Even so, Napoleon made an eleventh-hour bid for peace. He told
Whitworth that England could occupy Malta for ten years if France
could reoccupy Taranto. This would be a face-saver to cancel out the
most difficult clauses in the Treaty of Amiens. Whitworth forwarded
the proposal to Addington, who disingenuously turned it down on the
grounds of Britain's obligations to the King of Naples; that monarch in
fact was in no position to do any other than what England ordered him to
do.
So it was war. On I6 May I803 George III authorized letters of
marque for the seizure of French shipping and a state of war followed two
days later. All fairminded statesmen in Europe agreed that the war was
England's responsibility. Fox condemned Addington for playing Pitt's
warmongering game, while the great anti-slavery crusader William
Wilberforce declared that Malta was being retained only at the cost of a
violation of public faith - something no nation could afford to lose.
Napoleon, for whom the renewal of war came at least two years too early,
tried to put a brave face on it. He told his sister Elisa's chamberlain
Jerome Lucchesini: 'I am going to try for the most difficult of all
enterprises but the one which will be most fruitful of results of any I have
conceived. In three days misty weather and a bit of luck could make me
the master of London, Parliament and the Bank of England.'
The war thus begun would finally end only in I8I5. It is therefore
crucial to establish the responsibility for its outbreak and to see how the
revival of hostilities in I803 fitted Napoleon's ulterior designs. From
Talleyrand to Pieter Geyl, so many people have alleged that going to war
in I803 was the beginning of the end for Napoleon that scrupulous
examination is called for. Above all, why did Britain want war so badly in
marcin
(Marcin)
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