rubber-stamped the Emperor's decisions. The Assembly of Deputies
quickly declined to the level of farce, with a high level of absenteeism in
the electoral college responsible for presenting candidates; the reality was
that the electors were sulking about elections whose results were a
foregone conclusion. The Council of State, important under the
Consulate, lost much of its influence: Napoleon attended it irregularly
and imposed decisions without listening to the Councillors; sometimes he
would throw them a sop by bowing to their will on trivial matters.
Always a devotee of divide and rule, Napoleon complicated the
administration of France by dividing it up into more and more units,
appearing to devolve power even while he centralized it more rigidly.
Local assemblies were phased out in favour of 'general directorships'
based on arrondissements. But the heart of his centralizing policy was the
administrative council. This was a kind of cabinet, which met fo r lengthy
sessions (sometimes from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m.) on Mondays, Thursdays and
Saturdays, to examine one particular matter- be it the state of the Navy,
the military budget or the situation of French roads and bridges. To this
council were summoned Councillors of State, departmental chiefs and
fu nctional experts; all were invited to give an opinion but only the
Emperor decided. The notables disliked the administrative councils, for
they made a mockery of local government: the budget for the city of
Paris, for example, would be set by the council before it had even been
seen by the Parisian municipal council where the notables held sway.
All other bodies were even more empty of real power and influence.
The Council of Ministers, meeting on Wednesdays, quickly became a
mere talking shop. If Napoleon ever sought the advice of experts it was
for the Machiavellian purpose of modifying the draft of a senatus
consultum, never to discuss matters of real substance, even when he was
theoretically and constitutionally obliged to consult other opinions.
Napoleon found it impossible to delegate and insisted on making
decisions even on minor and trivial matters. His insistence on having his
finger in every pie led to near breakdown in the machinery of
government: the reductio ad absurdum came at the Battle of Leipzig in
1813 when, fighting for his life, he was asked as a matter of urgency to
approve the expenses of the Commissioner of St-Malo.
For a time the underlying discontent with the imperial system of
nobility did not manifest itself in opposition fr om the notables. The
initial problem was that, as Napoleon moved to put favourite sons and
daughters in positions of influence or dynastic marriages, other jealous
members of the Bonaparte clan would clamour for more privileges for
marcin
(Marcin)
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