with an equally large Franco-Spanish fleet simply meant that problems of
logistics and coordination were compounded. The elements of the
putative grand Armada were now dispersed in six different ports, the
French in Toulon, Rochefort, Brest and Ferrol, the Spanish in Cadiz and
Cartagena.
On 2 March r8os Napoleon composed a memorandum setting out his
grand naval strategy for that year. Villeneuve was ordered to find ways of
breaking out of Toulon again and this time staying out until he had
completed his mission; he was to pick up the Spanish in Cadiz and
Cartagena and sail to Martinique for rendezvous with Missiesy and the
Rochefort squadron (five battleships and three frigates). Since Villeneuve
commanded eleven battleships, six frigates and two corvettes and the
Spanish admiral Gravina had seven battleships and a frigate, at the
rendezvous there should already be a powerful French fleet. Yet
Napoleon's idea was that the greatest Franco-Spanish naval force ever
seen should assemble at Martinique, for he also ordered Admiral
Ganteaume to break out from Brest with his twenty-one ships of the line,
defeat the blockading squadron at Ferro} and take the French and
Spanish ships there to Martinique. A huge armada of more than forty
front-line warships would then proceed to Europe, keeping away from
land and shipping lanes. Since the British could not possibly know where
the various French squadrons were, and still less
.
that they had all united
at Martinique, there would be only a token force on guard at Ushant and
the Western Approaches. Brushing this aside, the Franco-Spanish fleet
was then to make all speed to Boulogne to cover the invasion flotilla.
Napoleon envisaged the final act of the drama taking place some time
between ro June and ro July. It is one of the great examples of wishful
thinking in the history of warfare. It assumed there would be no
problems from storm or high seas, that the Royal Navy would behave
exactly as he predicted, and that Nelson would be toiling far in the rear
when the Franco-Spanish fleet entered the Channel. It also assumed,
despite the evidence of the previous year, that Villeneuve and Ganteaume
would have no problem breaking the blockades at their respective ports.
Most of all, it betrayed an ignorance of the elementary facts of navigation.
Naturally, if an enemy army was investing French troops in a city, the
blockade could be broken by sending a relieving fo rce. Napoleon assumed
the same held good at sea, but a moment's consideration should have
shown him that his strategy was chimerical. If the wind was favourable
for a rescue fleet sailing/rom the west to relieve a blockade, it could not at
the same time be favourable for the blockaded fleet trying to escape to the
west.