vtttate central control fr om Madrid and play into the hands of the
Spanish guerrillas and, later, the British army under Wellington.
Bonapartist propaganda again went into top gear to present the short
imperial campaign of 18o8--o9 in Spain as an unalloyed personal triumph.
Napoleon's mistakes were glossed over, and the incontestable fact that
Napoleon had won three victories and chased a fourth army out of Spain
duly played up. However, Moore's diversion was the really significant
military event of 18o8--o9. By pulling Napoleon north of Madrid, he
prevented the Emperor's intended southward sweep, which might have
ended the war at a stroke. As it was, Moore's campaign bought Portugal
and southern Spain a year's respite and meant the 'Spanish ulcer' would
continue to suppurate.
Napoleon left Valladolid on 17 January and was in Paris on the 23rd.
Accompanied by Duroc, Savary and an escort of the Guard, he rode at a
fa st gallop and ate up the seventy-five miles between Valladolid and
Burgos in just five hours; Savary later claimed it was the fastest ride ever
achieved by any monarch. From Burgos the imperial party pressed on to
Tolosa and arrived in Bayonne in the small hours of the 19th, just forty
five hours after leaving Valladolid. Then it was on to Paris via Bordeaux
and Poitiers; he arrived in the capital at 8 a.m. on 23 January. The
Emperor's reasons for haste were twofold. First, he received definite
intelligence in Valladolid that the Austrians were mobilizing for a spring
campaign. Then came the in some ways even more disturbing news of a
plot hatched in Paris by Fouche and Talleyrand to depose him and
replace him with Murat. There was little time to lose.
marcin
(Marcin)
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