committed terrible atrocttles against their former masters, the only
consequence of the Emperor's scruples in this regard was that the serfs
visited atrocities on the French instead.
But perhaps more serious were the mistakes in the sphere where
Napoleon regarded himself as a master: strategic planning and execution.
Qu ite apart from his old fault of ignoring the seasons and the elements
when drawing up his plans, the emperor proved singularly defective in
logistics - an area where his mathematical ability should have come into
its own. The preparations at Danzig were impressive, and the port held
the desired 40o,ooo rations for fifty days, but no one had worked out how
to get these supplies to a front that got more distant day by day. The
factors of delay and distance meant that even if a food convoy got to the
front, it was likely already to have consumed one-third of what it was
transporting. Horses were a particular problem, for they needed nine
kilos of forage a day each, including the oats they were pulling for the
vast numbers (over roo,ooo) of cavalry mounts and artillery horses; when
set to graze on unripe rye, they simply died in thousands.
Since the Army moved much faster than its supply convoys, it was
constantly outstripping its own commissariat. The food wagons proved
unsuitable to Russian roads - really no more than rutted tracks - and
broke down in areas where there were no replacement horses or carts to
hand. The consequence was not only that vast amounts of stores were
dumped but that mills for grinding corn and ovens for baking bread
could not keep up with the Army. It was not long before starvation
loomed, for the initial twenty-day ration was consumed before the due
date. For a while the troops were able to slaughter cattle, but then came
the conundrum of living off the land where there was nothing to pillage.
The lack of the firm smack of discipline from the Emperor did not help.
Absurdly complaisant, he allowed his officers to bring servants and
luxuries with them. The men in the ranks took their cue from their
superiors, and the result was a huge subsidiary army of camp followers,
themselves wasting the Army's substance. An army corps accompanied
by hundreds of cattle on the hoof thronged the roads and blocked the
progress of the food and ammunition convoys behind.
Both militarily and logistically Napoleon would have done better with
an Army of half the size of the host he took into Russia. Hitherto,
Napoleon's victories had been gained with an Army of maximum size of
roo,ooo, which permitted the speed and flexibility that produced an
Austerlitz. Significantly, the Emperor had never before commanded an
Army of the size he led on to the steppes, and seems blithely to have
thought he could achieve a sixfold increase in his strike rate. It never
marcin
(Marcin)
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