Kutusov's clever dispositions, but astonished his marshals by opting for a
direct frontal assault on the Russian right and centre, leaving Poniatowski
to work round Bagration at Utitsa. Davout and Ney were to assault the
redoubts of Semonovski while to Eugene de Beauharnais went the
'mission impossible' - a near-suicidal attack on the heavily armoured
Great Redoubt. Junot's corps, Murat's cavalry and the Guard would be
held in reserve. The battle plan was so unimaginative that Davout begged
to be allowed to take 40,000 men and outflank the Russian left with an
overnight march. A listless Emperor would not hear of it: 'Ah, you are
always for turning the enemy. It is too dangerous a manoeuvre,' he told
Davout.
This lacklustre response to an obvious suggestion has always puzzled
military historians. It is well known that on 6-7 September the Emperor
was ill, with a heavy cold and a bladder infection , and to this illness the
many mishaps at Borodino are sometimes attributed. Others say that by
now he was worried by the calibre of his cavalry and the morale of his
infantry and that lack of numbers meant he had to rule out the idea of
detaching a large corps. But the more likely explanation is that Napoleon
was now desperate for a battle at all costs, having seen the Russians slip
through his net three times already. An additional factor may have been
that just before Borodino he received word that Wellington had won a
great victory at Salamanca in Spain. Circumstantial evidence works in
favour of this interpretation, for during the night of 6-7 September
the Emperor constantly rose from his bed to reassure himself that the
Russians were still there and had not once more melted away into the
night. It was not until 2 a.m. that he felt confident enough to issue one of
his famous bulletins.
The battle began with an artillery barrage at 6 a.m. on 7 September.
Then Napoleon ordered his forces forward. Ney and Davout performed
well but necessarily made slow progress over broken ground so, just two
hours into the battle, the Emperor committed Junot's corps from the
reserve. When Poniatowski attacked Bagration, Kutusov immediately
transferred troops from his right to prevent breakthrough. The Russian
commander then took the initiative, outflanking Borodino with his
cavalry; while the French attended to this threat, the assault on the Great
Redoubt was delayed. The marshals began to grow restive: the Emperor
was not at the front of his army, inspiring and exhorting his men while
watching minutely every nuance in the ebb and flow of battle; instead, he
remained in the rear, ill, indecisive, listless and querulous, suspicious of
the accuracy of every report brought to him. In frustration, Ney burst out
with: 'Why is the Emperor in the rear of the army? If ... he is no longer
marcin
(Marcin)
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