between his Cossacks and the French cavalry, insinuating the idea
that peace was just around the corner. Meanwhile he steadily added
to the 70,000 men he had been able to take away from Borodino. With
local reinforcements and the arrival of two fresh armies (Wittgenstein's
from Finland and Tornassov's from the south), he amassed a fighting
force zrs,ooo strong; Napoleon's numbers had meanwhile shrunk
to 95,000.
Frustrated at the non-arrival of Russian emissaries, Napoleon urged
Caulaincourt to undertake a mission to St Petersburg, but the ambassador
told his Emperor that all such overtures made to the stubborn Alexander
would be in vain. In fact obduracy was not the only factor that limited
the Czar's freedom of action; he was under constraints and if he had so
much as bargained with the French he would undoubtedly have been
deposed or assassinated. Moreover, he saw well enough the difficulty
the French were in and realized he held all the cards. In the end
Napoleon sent General Lauriston to treat with Kutusov, initially to
secure a laissez-passer for an embassy to St Petersburg. Kutusov refused
to allow Lauriston to proceed but agreed to take Bonaparte's letter,
proposing a compromise peace to the Czar; he did so, but Alexander did
not even deign to read it.
In the Kremlin, Napoleon was deluged with bad news. Communica
tions with Smolensk were becoming increasingly difficult as the Spanish
nightmare repeated itself, and semi-autonomous groups of peasant
guerrillas sprang into existence. Soon their leaders' names became as well
known as those of the bandidos in Spain: Davidov, Figner, Chetverakov.
These men pioneered the atrocities that would make the r8r2 campaign
in Russia one of the most ghastly in all history. Davidov's method was to
greet the French with exaggerated courtesy, offer them food and drink,
then slit their throats when they were drunk or asleep. The bodies would
then be burned in pigsties or deep in the forests, for French retaliation
was swift if ever they discovered newly-turned graves near a village.
Since so many patrols and supply convoys were cut off or ambushed by
Russian partisans, Napoleon was forced to issue orders that no force less
than r,soo-strong should ever leave Smolensk.
The Emperor knew from his Spanish experience that nothing
demoralized his men more than a war where to be taken prisoner meant a
far worse fate than a swift death in battle. He therefore tried to secure a
guarantee from Kutusov that atrocities would cease. Kutusov sloughed
off the responsibility and claimed that he could control only the troops in
his army. When Napoleon sent a formal letter demanding that a code of
behaviour be imposed on the peasants, Kutusov disingenuously replied as
marcin
(Marcin)
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