to divert from the south-westerly route meant that the destruction of the
French army became inevitable. So what led Napoleon to yet another
error of judgement, and this one the worst yet?
Moving swiftly in pursuit of the encumbered Grande Armee, Kutusov
caught up with it at the river crossing at Maloyaroslavets on 23 October.
Next day a ferocious battle for the town took place, during which it
changed hands seven times before the Italian corps under General Pino
rose to the occasion and drove the Russians out. Both sides withdrew,
prior, so it seemed, to a second Borodino. But then both commanders
dithered. Kutusov was shaken by the stirring performance of the Italians
and broke off contact to lick his wounds. Napoleon's scouts reported
Kutusov's army well dug in, too strong to attack. The Emperor was
downcast and indecisive: he told Caulaincourt mournfully: 'I always beat
the Russians but it never seems to solve anything.' He nearly had even
more serious reason for depression: at 4 a.m. a Cossack patrol came
within an ace of capturing him; it turned out that the Old Guard had
unaccountably failed to place pickets.
Convinced that his famous luck had deserted him, Napoleon sought
sanctuary in the known, however terrible, rather than in the unknown on
the south-western route. Never had his gambler's instinct more obviously
failed him; he did not even send out scouts on the Kaluga road, for had
he done so he would have discovered it was clear and unopposed. Instead
he called a council on 25 October, attended by Eugene, Murat, Davout,
Bessieres and Berthier, at which the reluctant decision was taken to
follow the devastated road to Smolensk through Borosk, Mojaisk, Gzatsk
and Viasma. The Emperor half-heartedly suggested a return to Moscow,
but this was shouted down. Murat boldly opted to continue via Kaluga
even if it meant risking another battle, but the other marshals fell in
eagerly with the idea that a north-westerly retreat might drop Kutusov
astern, especially as he seemed to be retiring southwards. When Bessieres
ventured to use the taboo word 'retreat', no one demurred.
Napoleon's panic - no other word will do - after the bruising
encounter at Maloyaroslavets shows he was no longer the great captain he
once was. The young Bonaparte would have seen the importance of
Maloyaroslavets and secured it long before the Russians got there.
Besides, the decision taken on 25 October evinces the utmost mental
confusion. Once the possibility of retreating from Moscow loomed, the
Emperor should have bent all his energies to gathering adequate supplies
for the Army. Moreover, if, as he claimed, his purpose in taking the
south-westerly route was to sweep Kutusov from his path, why did he
shirk the challenge when it came? If the fe ar of fu rther casualties deterred
marcin
(Marcin)
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