but most of them in the river as the bridges sank under the waters of the
Beresina, with a hiss like that of a gigantic ingot steeped in water by a
blacksmith; the river was choked with corpses for a week. The 30,ooo
survivors who were left on the east bank were then cut to pieces by the
Cossacks.
It had cost Napoleon 25,000 casualties in fighting men and 25 guns
plus the loss of the non-combatants to cross the Beresina. By any
standards the net result was a disaster but, playing up the miraculous
aspects of the Army's escape and the 20,000 or so casualties inflicted on
the Russians, he issued a communique and claimed a victory. At last the
survivors could rest secure fr om partisan attacks and close pursuit by the
Russian army, but now the real enemy was General Winter. The r6o
miles to Vilna saw the cruellest December on record. Wilson spoke of 'a
subtle, razor-cutting, creeping wind that penetrated the skin, muscle,
bone to the very marrow, rendering the skin as white, and the whole limb
affected as fragile, as alabaster.'
A week later the Grand Army was down to IJ,OOO effectives;
thousands more had simply fallen asleep and died in the snow. Napoleon
expressed no concern for the suffering, doubtless reckoning that in the
circumstances it was a waste of emotion. Despite notable instances of
great selfishness, discipline in the ranks was actually better now that
Kutusov and the partisans had been dropped astern. Kutusov largely
abandoned the pursuit at the Beresina, simply sending large squadrons of
Cossacks to harry the French. At Molodetchno, where the main road
from Minsk to Vilna joined them, there was a very sharp skirmish
between the rearguard and the Cossacks. Napoleon dismissed it as a
bagatelle and spent the 3rd of December composing his 29th bulletin, a
precis of the campaign, which admitted some part of the disaster but
played up Borodino, Krasnyi, Beresina, Ney's wanderings after Smo
lesnsk and all other heroic exploits of the Grande Armee.
This was the Emperor's last contribution to the r8r2 campaign for, at
Smorgoni at ro p.m. on 5 December, he left the Army, pleading the
necessity of getting back to Paris with all speed. For appearing to
abandon his army he has been much criticized and shades of Egypt in
1799 have been invoked. The comparison will not really hold, as indeed
has been pointed out by those of his critics who allege that it was even
more reprehensible to quit the Army now than in 1799, for in that case he
left shortly after a notable victory and in this he left after a disaster. On
the other hand, what was left of his Army was now almost safe, as it had
not been in Egypt, and Napoleon in self-defence cited the accepted
practice whereby a general was usually ordered home if his army was
marcin
(Marcin)
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