reduced to a single corps. He also feared that if he tarried in Poland,
Austria and Prussia would declare war and bar his passage back to
France. Most of all, though, his departure was dictated by pure raison
d'etat. After the Malet coup, it could only be a matter of time before there
was another attempted putsch; the Emperor could well arrive home to
find he had been deposed in his absence.
Accordingly, Napoleon made preparations fo r the swiftest possible
1,4oo-mile journey. Since they were still in hostile territory, it was
decided that the best method was to travel incognito in three coaches.
With him in his own coach were Caulaincourt, Duroc, Lobau, Fain the
Grand Marshal, the Mameluke valet Roustam and a Polish interpreter.
Escorted by Polish and Neapolitan cavalry, he thought it best not to enter
Vilna but met its governor, Maret, outside the walls while Caulaincourt
went in to buy warm clothing. The coaches and their escort then
proceeded through Kovno to Gragow where the Emperor decided to
exchange the carriage for a sleigh.
Once Napoleon left, morale in the French Army plummeted; there was
indiscipline and desertion even among the Guard. As if by some sort of
pathetic fallacy, the day after his departure was the coldest day of all, with
the temperature down to -36° F. Bonaparte's poor judgement of men
was once again made manifest as command devolved on Murat, who
began by inveighing against the Emperor, telling Davout they both
served a monster; Davout, who despised Murat, replied coldly that he
was a monster to whom Murat owed everything.
The death toll again began to rise. 20,000 men dropped away in the
three days between Smorgoni and Vilna. In the extreme cold it was
common for 400 men to cluster round a fire at night and in the morning
for 300 of them to be dead. Soldiers started setting entire houses on fire
and standing round the flaming ruins all night. On the march to Vilna the
food shortage was so acute that some men ate their own severed fingers
and drank their own blood. But the greatest killer was gangrene - an
inevitable consequence of men trying to warm frozen limbs at the fire.
Since at these temperatures water froze a mere three feet from the fire,
one could only get warm by getting burnt; men became gangrenous
simply because they had no sensation in their limbs and got too close to
the heat. All who braved the horrors of that winter suffered frightfully,
not just the French. Contrary to popular belief, the pursuing Russians
were not well equipped against the winter. In recoiling in horror at the
casualty list of the Grand Army, it is easy to fo rget that Ioo,ooo Russians
died in the snows in addition to battle casualties.
Poland and friendly territory lay tantalizingly close, but still the
marcin
(Marcin)
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