Russia, he proved the truth of Clausewitz's observation that to advance
deep into enemy country is itself a kind of defeat. By the time of
Borodino the Emperor had lost so many men that he lacked the resources
for decisive victory. Apart from losses through disease and starvation,
another factor was at play. The longer his lines of communication, the
more troops he had to detach for secondary roles - the protection of
depots, internal security, the garrisoning of cities captured, the provision
of escorts for couriers and envoys. To spend a month in Moscow waiting
for the Czar to surrender made no sense; why did Bonaparte not
remember that French possession of Vienna had not weighed with the
Austrians in 1805 nor the loss of Berlin with the Prussians in 18o6?
Napoleon's explanation of the disaster of 1812 was peculiarly
disingenuous. He was right to be scornful of the Russian Army, since
Kutusov's much-lauded strategy of trading space for time was a pure
accident, not something he intended. Kutusov has often been claimed as
'the man who defeated Napoleon' but in fact his military calibre, both at
Borodino and during the French retreat, was not impressive. But
Napoleon in his own apologia quickly moved from a warranted
proposition to pure fantasy. He claimed that his total numbers were
40o,ooo and that only 16o,ooo went beyond Smolensk; of this total of
40o,ooo half were German or Italian and only 140,ooo members of the
polyglot army spoke French. So, according to Bonaparte's numerical
legerdemain, only so,ooo Frenchmen were lost in 1812 and the Russians
lost four times total allied fatalities! This sort of cynicism gives powerful
ammunition to those who claim that the Emperor never really thought of
anyone but himself.
His fu rther 'explanation' for 1812 was also mendacious. He claimed
that he beat the Russians at all points but was then overcome by 'General
Winter'. But winter was only a major factor in the latter stages of the
retreat, more especially after Beresina. The sober facts are that the
French lost more men - through starvation, exhaustion, sickness,
capture, desertion and death in battle - on the advance to Moscow than
on the retreat. The Grand Army suffered more from the heat of July and
August, and the initial stages of the Russian winter in 1812 were mild. It
was, after all, because of the thaw that Napoleon faced the great crisis at
the Beresina. But the self-serving myth propagated by the Emperor - that
he was defeated only by the weather- took hold, gained acceptance and is
the received opinion today - surely the ultimate triumph for Bonapartist
propaganda.
It is a clue to Napoleon's personality that his explanation for disaster
always hinges on fate. The excuses are all 'ifs': if Moscow had not been
marcin
(Marcin)
#1