Napoleon: A Biography

(Marcin) #1

men blistered themselves and then dressed the sores with water and
arsenic to make them incurable; others gave themselves hernias and
applied corrosive acid to their genitals. Napoleon retaliated by calling up
the class of r8q a year early, by a systematic sweep to find the draft
dodgers of earlier years and by transferring 8o,ooo National Guardsmen
to the Army. Once again the Emperor discovered the difference between
paper numbers and reality, for it turned out that only four-fifths of the
notional strength of the National Guard existed.
Napoleon's overall aim was to recruit 65o,ooo new soldiers by mid­
r8r3. With the 137,000 conscripts just completing training and the
transferred National Guardsmen he had less than a third of the total. He
therefore called up the class of 1814 in February r8r3 and demanded
fresh troops from Germany and Italy. Mounted gendarmes were turned
into cavalry and 20,000 sailors were retreaded into the Army. By also
calling up 10o,ooo conscripts of r8o9, r81o, 18r r and r8r2 he somehow
levied 350,000 men for the r813 campaign. Further calls in April, August
and October, including a levy on the r8r5 class produced another 16o,ooo
by the end of the year. But the calibre of the new Army was poor at every
level, especially the officers. The top-class officers of the Grande Armee of
the golden age were mostly dead, since good officers led from the front.
And the Emperor suffered mightily from a shortage of mounts for his
cavalry, since 250,000 had perished in Russia and most of the horse­
rearing areas of eastern Europe were by now in enemy hands. Lack of
horses meant that Napoleon would fight the r813 campaign, in effect,
with one hand tied between his back, as he could neither gather
intelligence efficiently nor pursue a defeated enemy.
Napoleon's original strategy for 1813 had been to retake Berlin and
fight the campaign between the Elbe and the Oder, using the fortresses of
Torgau, Wittenburg, Magdeburg and Hamburg as pivots. This would
enable him to relieve the 15o,ooo French troops bottled up in the Vistula
fortresses - Danzig, Thorn and Modlin - thus forcing Prussia out of the
war and turning Kutusov's flank. But Josephine's unfortunate son was
constantly outflanked, to Napoleon's disgust, especially when Eugene
abandoned Hamburg and concentrated at Dresden. In any case, this
initial Bonaparte conception required an Army of 30o,ooo seasoned
troops which the Emperor did not possess. At a pinch he could have put
that number of raw levies in the field, but how would they stand up
against Kutusov's veterans? And what of the Confederation of the Rhine?
Would Saxony and Bavaria remain loyal?
After some dithering, the German allies reluctantly threw in their lot
with the French. Napoleon's initial moves in the campaign were

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