Napoleon: A Biography

(Marcin) #1

It may well be that the balance of his mind at this juncture affected the
entire course of the 1813 campaign, for the grief-stricken Emperor called
off the pursuit, allowing the bickering Allies to fall back in disarray to
Silesia. Although Napoleon now held most of the trumps, especially
when Davout captured Hamburg, he gratefully accepted an offer of
mediation from Austria. An armistice was signed at Pleschwitz on 2 June
which had the effect of suspending the conflict for two months. Unaware
of Metternich's intense animosity, Napoleon naively thought that his
naming Marie-Louise regent would guarantee Austrian neutrality. In fact
the Machiavellian Metternich was determined to bring Austria into the
war, but needed a breathing space in which his dejected military partners
could recover their spirits.
Although Napoleon has been severely criticized for falling into his
enemies' trap by accepting the armistice, there were rational grounds for
his decision. His army was already exhausted and had sustained 25,000
more casualties than the enemy in the campaign as a whole; there were
90,000 men on the sick list and desertion had reached epidemic
proportions; additionally ammunition and supplies were scarce because of
raids on lines of communication by Cossacks and German partisans. But,
crucially, he lacked a good intelligence network, so did not realize the
Allies were in a desperate position. After Bautzen there was acrimonious
recrimination between Russians and Prussians; on the Russian side
Wittgenstein resigned, to be replaced by Barclay de Tolly, who withdrew
to Silesia. With enough horses to equip proper reconnaissance parties and
cavalry pursuit, Napoleon would already have won total victory. This
became clear when Oudinot's advance on Berlin ground to a halt because
he had not enough horsemen to keep the harrying Cossacks at bay.
Each side regarded the armistice as a mere lull, each pinning hopes on
Austria. It was clear that neither side could score a complete victory
without the Habsburgs. Everything hinged on whether Austria would be
most swayed by the matrimonial alliance with France or by the desire for
revenge for humiliations extending from 1796 to 1809. This was the
moment when Metternich came forward as mediator, on certain terms:
Prussia was to be restored, the Confederacy of the Rhine dissolved, and
France restricted to the 'natural frontiers'; Napoleon was to release
Austria from any political or military obligations so that she could be an
honest broker, and Prussia and Russia were to appoint Metternich sole
agent, so that there was no possibility of a separately negotiated backstairs
peace with France by either of them.
Napoleon agreed to recognize Metternich as mediator and to hold
'talks about talks' to resolve the substantive issues. One of the most

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