Dispersing his corps like this seemed an obvious mistake, not only
because it vitiated the doctrine of concentration of force, but because it
meant the Emperor would have to rely on the independent judgement of
marshals, used simply to executing part of his grand battlefield
conception. Moreover, it played right into the hands of the Allied
strategy of attrition. It is hard to understand what lay behind this
decision. The best guess is that he wanted to disguise his essential
weakness fr om the Allies: since even if he won at Dresden he lacked the
strength to follow them into Poland, a northern campaign would show
evidence of the 'advance' he would need to claim in his bulletins. Even
the marshals protested at the decision. Marmont said gloomily: 'I greatly
fear that on the day we gain a great victory, the Emperor may learn he has
lost two.'
If the early months of the 1813 campaign had seen Napoleon back to
something like his best military form, the late summer and autumn found
him back in his vacillating 1812 mood. From 17-21 August he dithered
unconscionably. He advanced to Bautzen, learned the Russians intended
to reinforce Blucher and decided to strike him before they could do so.
Then he decided instead to intercept the 40,000 Russians. Next he
changed his mind again and decided to assault Blucher at Breslau, only to
find the Prussian withdrawing before him, in accordance with the Allied
plan. While Napoleon was trying to pin Blucher down, Schwarzenberg
advanced from Prague to threaten Dresden. It now seemed possible to
strike Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia on a vulnerable flank, so
Napoleon ordered Marshal Gouvion St-Cyr to hold out in Dresden while
he got into position. But word came back that Dresden could no longer
hold out. This put the Emperor in a dilemma. He hated to give up his
idea for a flank attack but on the other hand could not afford to lose
Dresden with its massed supplies of artillery, its ammunition dumps and
food supplies.
In an unsatisfactory compromise Napoleon divided his forces and took
most of them back to Dresden, leaving just a single corps under
Vandamme to harry Schwarzenberg's flank. Some military historians
have claimed that if the decision had been reversed, Napoleon would have
won the victory he sought. The new French army bore itself in the great
traditions of the Grande Armee by an astonishing 90-mile forced march in
72 hours. They arrived at Dresden on 26 August just in time to repel
Wittgenstein's Russians, who had already reached the suburbs. Napoleon
expressed contempt for his marshals, railing that he could not be
everywhere at once. But his fury was matched by that of the Czar, who
saw the prize snatched from him. None the less, Alexander was prepared
marcin
(Marcin)
#1