Napoleon: A Biography

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fighting on 12-13 February the Prussians and Russians lost 6,ooo, the
French no more than 6oo.
Once again it was bad news from other fronts that led Napoleon to
break off the pursuit of his quarry. It was Victor who had let Blucher
through the net to menace Paris earlier and it was again Victor who let
the Emperor down. Napoleon had been reasonably confident about
holding the Army of Bohemia at arm's length, for the key to Paris was the
Nogent bridge over the Seine and he had left clear contingency plans to
blow it up if it could not be defended. However, the Austrians found
another bridge at Bray, ten miles west, and crossed there. Victor
abandoned the Nogent bridge to avoid encirclement, thus precipitating
another panic in Paris. But Schwarzenberg did not take the gleaming
opportunity apparently offered him. He was afraid of being caught
between Napoleon's fo rce and the other army Augereau was supposed to
have raised in Lyons. Moreover, he was finally running into partisan
resistance as the French peasants, enraged by Allied looting, at last began
showing signs of the guerrilla spirit.
When Blucher heard the news from the Seine, he naturally calculated
that Napoleon would be forced to go to the help of his capital, giving the
Prussians the opportunity to take them in the rear. The Emperor was
keen to encourage this thinking and laid out a decoy for the Prussians,
using the small forces of Marmont's corps, Grouchy's cavalry and the
Guard as bait. Blucher fell for the trap and came within an ace of being
surrounded; he was saved only because the roads, muddy after melted
snow, prevented Grouchy from bringing up the horse artillery to finish
the Prussians off. Nevertheless at Vauchamps on 14 February Napoleon
inflicted 7 ,ooo casualties for the loss of just 6oo.
In the so-called 'Six Days Campaign' of February 1814 , Napoleon
returned to his peerless best as a commander, inevitably recalling his
successes in 1796--97. He could probably have finished off Blucher and
the Prussians on 13 February but for the hiccup caused by the news from
the Seine front. As it was, he caused Allied losses of 2o,ooo and seized a
large number of guns. The key to his success was that he had a small
army (3o,ooo) under his personal direction, much as in the Italian
campaign of 1796-97. A generalization becomes inevitable: Napoleon was
a brilliant commander of small armies which he could mould to his will as
a conductor moulds an orchestra, but the huge armies of 1812 and 1813
spiralled out of his control; the Emperor had in a sense promoted himself
to his own level of incompetence. The irony of the 'Six Days' was that all
Napoleon's brilliance availed him nothing. Within days Blucher had

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