The French lost 25,000 in dead and wounded at Waterloo plus some
8,ooo prisoners; Wellington's casualties were I s,ooo (including more than
fifty per cent of his officers) and the Prussians' 7,000. Altogether during
the three days of I6--I8 June the Allies had lost ss,ooo against 6o,ooo of
the French. Wellington went on to fame and immortality on the strength
of this victory, but he could not have won without Prussian intervention,
which was only the most signal of Napoleon's blunders throughout the
day. A fair non-Anglocentric judgement would be that Napoleon lost the
battle through his own multiple errors rather than that Wellington won it
by singular military genius. It is doubtful that the Emperor's illness made
any real difference, though his arch-defenders claim that this resulted
from a poisoning attempt or that his plans had been betrayed to the
British by a spy. The plain truth seems to be that Napoleon performed
far below his best form, and that something happened to his martial
talents in general during the lacklustre fo ur-day Belgian campaign.
Napoleon rode away from the battle towards Charleroi, tears coursing
down his cheeks, his face described as a mask of pain and exhaustion.
Next day he made a partial recovery as he reassessed the situation. On
paper his fortunes after Waterloo were by no means so desperate as they
are usually presented. Given that Grouchy had disengaged at Wavre with
most of his corps intact, the Emperor still had I 17,000 men available for
the defence of Paris to face roughly the same number under Blucher and
Wellington. By I July he would have another rzo,ooo men plus 36,ooo
National Guardsmen, 3o,ooo sharpshooters, 6,ooo gunners and 6oo
artillery pieces for the defence of Paris. The Allies could not cross the
Somme with much more than 90,000 men while the Austrians and
Russians could not be on the Marbe before rs July, by which time the
Emperor calculated he could have 8o,ooo sharpshooters in position,
doling out unacceptable casualties on the advancing enemy columns. As
he remarked to Joseph, what was needed now was the spirit of Rome after
the disaster of Cannae, not the defeatist spirit of the Carthaginians after
the battle of Zama.
What was missing was his own energy and commitment. France could
be mobilized to fight for the Emperor only if he showed the face of a
fighter who would never give up. But Napoleon was depressed, ill,
suffering from lack of sleep and, above all, indecisive. When he conferred
with his generals, there were divided counsels. Davout urged him to
return to Paris, prorogue the Senate and the Chamber, and set himself up
as a dictator. Others urged him to ignore constitutional niceties
altogether, ignore Paris and remain in the field with his Army. But as he
did so often during the Hundred Days, Napoloen chose a third option,
marcin
(Marcin)
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