less satisfactory than either: he decided to return to Paris and work within
the context of constitutional niceties. This was such a gross error that it is
hard not to see him at this juncture unconsciously willing his own
destruction. Later he himself admitted his decision was an act of
consummate fo lly and could scarcely give a rational account of it.
The situation in Paris was parlous, as everybody knew; indeed it had
been emphasized again and again by those of his supporters who urged
him to remain in the field. During the Hundred Days, as part of his new
liberal image, Napoleon had officially shared power with his Ministers
and the two chambers. To prevent Ministers and Assembly from making
common cause, he ordered a total separation of powers, forbidding his
Ministers to have any contact with the Legislature. But in his absence
Fouche campaigned tirelessly against him. Once news of Waterloo came
in, Fouche bent all his energies to fomenting panic in Paris, stressing that
the Grand Army had been totally destroyed and that Bonaparte was
returning to make himself a dictator. Fouche had long been plotting for
the contingency of the Emperor's military defeat, when he thought the
hour of Fouche would come at last. The question is why Napoleon, as
usual, did nothing about him. He threatened to hang him after his first
victory in Belgium and later remarked ruefully: 'If I had just hanged two
men, Talleyrand and Fouche, I would still be on the throne today.' There
is a continuing mystery about his weakness when faced with the treachery
of the trio of Bernadotte, Talleyrand and Fouche, which no student of
Napoleon has ever satisfactorily explained.
Given all this, it was absurd for Napoleon to return to Paris and play
by the constitutional rule-book. He should have seized control and
dissolved the Legislature as Davout urged, relying on the loyalty of the
garrison and people of France. When he reached Paris at dawn on 21
June, he still had powerful cards up his sleeve. He had plenty of support,
for his lucid way with statistics persuaded wavering Ministers to give him
their backing, while even Carnot joined Lucien, La Bedoyere and Davout
in pleading for the immediate imposition of martial law and the removal
of the fr actious Legislature to Tours. They pointed out that the people
were on his side - a fact evident when the crowd acclaimed him in fr ont
of the Elysee. Once again Napoleon dithered. But if he was lacking in
energy, the diabolical Fouche was not. On 2r June, at his instigation, the
two chambers declared themselves in permanent session, indissoluble
except by their own will, and called in the National Guard for protection.
Repeatedly urged to use force against the Chamber of Deputies,
Napoleon refused, on grounds of refusal to shed blood and unwillingness
to head a 1793-style revolution. Foolishly he declared he would never
marcin
(Marcin)
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