Extreme Ownership: How U.S. Navy SEALs Lead and Win

the local populace or with the foreign military units they are working
with. In some cases, such an appearance might even be required. But
here in Ramadi, in close proximity with conventional forces on bases
owned and operated by the Army and Marine Corps, this was bound to
cause friction.
In the minds of some of the members of this new unit, they were
above conforming to the colonel’s strict grooming policies. But that
alone was an issue that could be overcome. After all, a clean uniform
does not a good soldier make. But the problems didn’t stop there. Some
of the unit’s U.S. advisors did not address the 1/506th Soldiers with
professionalism and respect. They talked down not only to rank Soldiers
but also to senior leaders. Considering virtually every rifleman in the
1/506th had more combat experience than most of the men in this unit
ever would, this was especially shocking.
To make matters worse, the new unit made it clear that they had little
interest in listening to advice or learning from the SEAL platoon
commander and his men. After weeks of sustained combat operations in
one of the worst sectors of Ramadi, our SEALs had learned lessons that
saved lives. From specific gear needed to how much ammunition to
carry, to the amount of water needed for missions, to effective tactics
and communications plans, the SEALs had learned a great deal about
conducting operations with 1/506th in this specific area. When they
attempted to pass this valuable information on to the new unit, their
advice was shunned. Overconfidence was risky in such a hostile
environment, a mistake most often made by warriors who had never
truly been tested.
Because of the thousands of well-armed insurgents and the extreme
violence that engulfed Ramadi, every U.S. unit had to carefully