same. The true sacrifices endured by the troops who fought this war were
far beyond anything that most Americans could comprehend.
Within our own beloved SEAL community, we heard the mutterings
of criticism about our operations from the armchair quarterbacks in the
rear echelon, far from the battlefield. They clearly didn’t understand
what we had done and why. They didn’t witness the impact of our
operations or the difference we had made. With angry emotion, I
wrestled with how best to professionally respond to those critics,
particularly from senior officers with no real combat experience. Part of
me wanted to punch them in the mouth. But a bigger part of me just
wanted them to understand what we had accomplished and why. I knew
that anyone who truly comprehended what Task Unit Bruiser had done
and who understood the incredible victory the U.S. Army Ready First
Brigade had achieved in Ramadi would respect not only the bravery and
dedication of the troops but also the strategic success—securing Ramadi
and Anbar Province from the brink of disaster. It had been a monumental
triumph for U.S. forces on one of the toughest battlefields anywhere,
when many doubted we could win. The doubters had been proved wrong.
Some within the SEAL community said we took too much risk, that
our sniper operations were just playing “whac-a-mole.” Used to a
paradigm of traditional Special Operations, they could not comprehend
the adaptations we had made or the risk those adaptations held. Nor did
they understand the nature of counterinsurgency and the spectacular
reversal toward peace and security that had been achieved.
Some of the politicians and most senior military brass in Washington
felt that killing bad guys only created more enemies. But they didn’t
have a clue. Our lethal operations were crucial to securing the populace.
Each enemy fighter killed meant more U.S. Soldiers and Marines came
jeff_l
(Jeff_L)
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