an entry door, coordination with supporting aircraft, managing an assault
force of Iraqi soldiers—those SEAL operators still better understood the
mission, the detailed steps taken to mitigate those risks we could control,
the Commander’s Intent behind why we were conducting that specific
operation. The SEALs with little or no ownership were somewhat in the
dark. As a result, they had a harder time understanding why we were
taking the risks we were taking and what specific impact we had in the
campaign to liberate Ramadi.
Looking back, one of the greatest lessons learned for me was that I
could have done a far better job of leading down the chain of command. I
should have given greater ownership of plans to the troops—especially
those who were negative and weren’t fully committed to the mission. I
should have taken the time to better understand how what we were doing
contributed to the strategic mission. I should have asked those questions
to Jocko and on up my chain of command. I should have put together a
routine strategic overview brief and regularly delivered this to Charlie
Platoon’s operators so that they could understand what we had
accomplished and how our missions furthered the strategic goals of
stabilizing Ramadi and securing the populace. With the physical
hardship of operating in Iraqi summertime heat reaching 117 degrees
Fahrenheit, carrying heavy loads of gear, and routinely engaging in
fierce firefights with enemy forces, the SEAL operators in Charlie
Platoon needed greater context to understand why that was necessary.
Seeing the Ramadi overview slide that Jocko had built, I now understood
what we had done and, more important, understood what leading down
the chain of command was all about. It was a hard lesson to learn but one
I will never forget.
PRINCIPLE: LEADING DOWN THE CHAIN