what you need them to do, you first have to look at yourself. Rather than
blame them for not seeing the strategic picture, you must figure out a
way to better communicate it to them in terms that are simple, clear, and
concise, so that they understand. This is what leading down the chain of
command is all about.
CAMP MARC LEE, RAMADI, IRAQ: LEADING UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
“You gotta be kidding me!” I shouted as I burst into Jocko’s office
inside the TOC. I was fuming. “Are they serious?”
Our TOC was located in a large three-story building on the bank of
the Euphrates River, which previously housed some of Saddam
Hussein’s senior military brass before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Now the once elaborate building was battered and worse for wear. It was
the centerpiece of our SEAL camp, just beyond the large U.S. forward
operating base of Camp Ramadi at the edge of the war-torn city.
Invading armies had camped along this very riverbank for millennia:
Babylonians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Ottoman Turks, and
British troops. Now American forces, including Navy SEALs and
support personnel of Task Unit Bruiser, were here for a time.
I was furious and venting my frustration at Jocko. “Unbelievable.
How do they expect us to actually plan our operations when they are
bombarding us with ludicrous questions?” I asked.
Jocko had just forwarded me an e-mail from our higher headquarters
staff, led by our SEAL Team’s commanding officer (CO). The e-mail in
question asked for clarification on an upcoming operation that Charlie
Platoon planned to execute in the next few hours.
As one of two platoon commanders in Task Unit Bruiser, I was
Jocko’s direct report, his immediate subordinate. Jocko reported directly
to the CO, often through the CO’s staff, who had sent the e-mail. While