and closely allied with Iran, as a national hero. Every so often, reports
surfaced of Iraqi soldiers who turned their weapons on their U.S. Army
or Marine Corps advisors. With that knowledge, how could trust be
built?
In addition to poor training, the Iraqi soldiers were barely equipped
for a camping trip, much less combat operations. Some wore sneakers or
sandals. Their uniforms were a mix-and-match collection of military
clothing in American, Soviet, or Middle Eastern camouflage. The variety
of clothing made it hard to distinguish friend from foe—especially in an
environment where the enemy also wore paramilitary uniforms and gear.
Iraqi soldiers’ web gear (or load-bearing equipment) consisted of
tattered canvas Soviet-era chest rigs with AK-47 magazine pouches that
often fell apart. The weapons they carried were a mix of rifles
confiscated from insurgents, many of them poorly made Iraqi or Chinese
copies of the AK-47. Most were in poor shape and far below the
standards of the original Russian design. It was not uncommon to find
the weapons rusted to the point that the sites could not be adjusted. Their
technology generally stopped at their weapon. They had no night-vision
goggles, no lasers, no radios. In fact, very few even had a simple
flashlight. Their body armor was ancient with questionable
effectiveness.
* * *Task Unit Bruiser was charged with getting our Iraqi soldiers equipped,
organized, and, most important, trained and ready to fight the insurgents
who seemed to be increasingly effective against U.S. military forces. In
less-hostile areas of Iraq, this meant building training programs on
secure bases and running Iraqi soldiers through basic soldiering skills