Extreme Ownership: How U.S. Navy SEALs Lead and Win

which they could defend their country from terrorist insurgents, then
who would defend it? The answer was all too clear: us, the U.S. military.
We would be stuck here securing their country for them for generations.
The disparity between the capability of the poorly trained, ill-
equipped, and unmotivated Iraqi soldiers and that of the determined,
well-equipped, and highly effective insurgent fighters they were up
against was gigantic. Virtually every time an American outpost in
Ramadi was handed over to the control of Iraqi soldiers, insurgents
attacked and overran their position, killing dozens of Iraqi troops and
sometimes the U.S. Marine or Army advisors assigned to them. The Iraqi
soldiers were no match for the insurgents. It would take generations of
training to get the Iraqi soldiers to the level needed to overcome and
defeat such an aggressive enemy. Even then, such lackluster soldiers
would likely never be capable of fighting and defeating a serious
adversary. For those of us on the front lines of this conflict, it was clear
that there were many senior U.S. military officers who, far removed
from direct interaction with Iraqi soldiers, did not understand the Iraqi
Army’s true lack of capability. They were simply terrible, and no
amount of training would make them excellent soldiers; but perhaps we
could make them good enough.
As I thought about this, I realized that there was something that we—
Task Unit Bruiser and other U.S. and coalition forces—could do. These
Iraqi troops, or jundhis,^1 as they called themselves in Arabic, may never
be good enough to take on a well-equipped and determined enemy. But
they could be good enough to handle a less substantial enemy. We could
ensure the current enemy fit into that category by reducing the
insurgents’ ability to wage war. In addition to building the Iraqi Army’s
capability through training and combat-advising on the battlefield, we