Extreme Ownership: How U.S. Navy SEALs Lead and Win

(our SEALs and U.S. forces) would have to crush the insurgency and
lower its capability to a point where Iraqi soldiers and police would at
least have a chance to maintain a relative peace by themselves—a
chance to win. In order to do that, our Task Unit Bruiser SEALs needed
to get outside the wire, onto the battlefield, and inflict serious damage on
insurgent fighters. But we couldn’t operate unless our combat missions
received approval through our chain of command. The SEAL task unit
that had been in Ramadi for the months prior to our arrival had told us
they planned a number of combat operations that consisted of only
SEALs—without Iraqi soldiers. Almost all of those operations had been
denied approval. In order to receive that approval, I knew we must take
Iraqi soldiers with us on every operation. They were our ticket to leave
the base, push into enemy territory, and unleash fury upon the
insurgents.
With that, I understood, and I believed. Now, I had to ensure that my
troops understood and believed.
I called for a meeting and pulled all the SEAL operators from Task
Unit Bruiser together into the briefing room.
“Alright fellas,” I said. “You’ve heard the rumors. Every operation
we conduct will include Iraqi soldiers.” There were mutterings of
obscenities and loud exhales of disgust. I repeated: “Every mission we
undertake we will fight alongside jundhis.” The room cut loose again,
this time with louder disagreement and curses. The consensus from our
SEALs, the frontline troops who would execute our missions, was clear:
“This is garbage.”
I cut the not-so-subtle protest short: “I understand. The battlefield
here in Ramadi is dangerous. It’s difficult. Why make it even harder by
forcing us to fight alongside Iraqi soldiers?” Damn right, nodded much