By some estimates, nonnationals may even out-
number UAE citizens. The majority of the coun-
try’s populace follows Sunni Islam (80 percent)
and the Maliki tradition of law. The Shia are a
minority (16 percent). The rest includes Chris-
tians, Hindus, Buddhists, Bahais, and Sikhs, who
have freedom of worship. Christians, Hindus, and
Sikhs have their own churches and temples, while
others conduct their religious practices at home.
Oil has brought the country great prosperity since
its discovery there in 1958, and its per capita
income is now comparable to that of countries
in western Europe. The UAE has also become a
flourishing center of international commerce and
a modern architectural showcase; buildings there
reflect Islamic and Western motifs.
See also gUlF Wars; organization oF petro-
leUm eXporting coUntries.
Further reading: Helen Chapin Metz, The Persian Gulf
States: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Federal
Division, Library of Congress, 1994); Rosemarie Said
Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
Gulf Wars
Between 1980 and the present (2008), the Persian
Gulf region was subject to three major conflicts
that pitted country against country, Muslim against
Muslim, and Muslims against the United states,
Great Britain, and their allies. Although religion was
not the cause for these conflicts, it nonetheless was
an important factor. The conflicts, in turn, affected
the ways in which religion was used by the various
parties involved to serve their short- and long-term
strategies and policy objectives. In addition, compe-
tition for control of the world’s largest oil fields was
a key element in each of the conflicts.
ThE IrAN-IrAQ WAr OF 1980–1988
This, the first of the modern Gulf wars, began on
September 22, 1980, when Iraqi forces invaded
iran by crossing the Shatt al-Arab waterway into
southwestern Iran. A major cause of the conflict
was a long-standing dispute between the two
nations over control of this vital waterway, which
is used for transporting oil to global markets
via the Persian Gulf. iraq had been obliged by a
United Nations resolution in 1975 to share the
waterway jointly with Iran, a development that
saddam hUsayn (d. 2006), Iraq’s president, saw
as an insult to his country’s sovereignty. Another
area of contention was Iraq’s historic claim to the
Iranian province of Khuzistan (also known as
Arabistan), where there was a large population
of Arabs whom Iraq felt needed its protection. In
1980, Husayn perceived that the overthrow of the
Pahlavi monarchy in 1979 by an Islamic revolu-
tion led by Ayatollah rUhollah khomeini (d.
1989), the charismatic Shii leader, had left Iran’s
defenses weak and in disarray. Husayn concluded
that this was a situation he could exploit to make
Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. At
the same time, Husayn was angered by efforts
undertaken by Iranian agents to stir up resistance
against his government among Iraqi Shia, the
country’s majority population, who live in the
southern part of the country, where many of Iraq’s
oil fields are located.
Religion was used in the war to win popular
support domestically and appeal to the wider
Muslim community. After initial losses on the
battlefield, Iranian forces rallied, with the back-
ing of thousands of youthful volunteers called
the Basij, who were encouraged to become holy
martyrs by dying for their country in imitation of
Imam Husayn, the heroic grandson of Muham-
mad who perished in the battle of karbala in
680 fighting the forces of tyranny and injustice.
By 1982, Iran had regained much of the terri-
tory initially lost to the Iraqi offensive. Saddam
Husayn, on the other hand, attempted to mobilize
Iraqi patriotism by recalling the Battle of Qadisi-
yya (ca. 636), in which Arab Muslim armies were
thought to have decisively defeated the Sassanian
Persian army, opening all of Iran to conquest. HeGulf Wars 273 J