With the air campaign well under way, a
ground attack, known as Desert Saber, was
launched from Saudi Arabia into Kuwait and
southern Iraq on February 24. Iraqi troops were
quickly overcome and driven out of Kuwait in less
than six days, and on March 3, 1991, Iraq agreed
to a cease-fire and to abide by previous UN resolu-
tions. President George H. W. Bush (r. 1988–93)
and his advisers agreed not to try to advance to
baghdad and overthrow Saddam Husayn because
of the tremendous costs in life and resources
this would involve. Instead, on April 3, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 687, which
set terms for a permanent cease-fire and required
Iraq to allow on-site inspections for weapons of
mass destruction, renounce terrorism, and pay
reparations from its oil revenues. The coalition
withdrew its forces from southern Iraq, but later,
in 1992–93, the United States and Great Britain
created zones in the airspace over the northern
and southern thirds of the country where Iraqi
military aircraft were not allowed to fly (known as
no-fly zones). These were to protect the Kurds, an
ethnic group in northern Iraq, and the Shia from
Husayn’s forces, but they also gave the United
States and Britain the ability to strike at his forces
whenever necessary.
The religious dimensions of this war were
complex. Many Muslim authorities and Islamic
activist groups quickly reacted to the invasion of
Kuwait by condemning Husayn and Iraq. egypt,
syria, and Saudi Arabia joined the U.S.-led coali-
tion. Although some Islamic leaders favored using
non-Muslim troops to protect Saudi Arabia and
expel Iraq from Kuwait, most leading voices advo-
cated letting Muslim countries resolve the conflict
among themselves. Also, some Islamist groups
objected that the stationing of non-Muslim troops
in Saudi Arabia would profane the holy cities of
mecca and medina, and many were suspicious
of American and Israeli hegemonic designs on
the region. Saddam Husayn himself appealed to
the support of Muslims on such grounds, even
though many in the region regarded him as a
religious hypocrite and disbeliever. In an effort to
enhance his Islamist credentials, Husayn added
the religious phrase Allah akbar (God is greatest)
to the Iraqi flag.
The mUslim brotherhood in Egypt and its
counterpart in pakistan, the Jamaat-i islami, joined
those who first condemned Saddam Husayn’s
actions, but as the war progressed, they voiced
their opposition to the coalition force, fearing that
it secretly wanted to recolonize Muslim lands.
Many North African Muslim leaders held similar
views. Public opinion in Jordan was strongly
pro-Iraqi, and the Muslim Brotherhood effectively
mobilized to win seats in parliament and in King
Husayn ibn Talal’s (r. 1950–99) cabinet. Iran’s Shii
revolutionary government opposed both Saddam
Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait and the dispatching
of American troops to the region, even going so
far as to call for a Jihad against the United States.
They proceeded to finalize a cease-fire with Iraq
and offered sanctuary to Iraq’s air force so that it
would not be destroyed.
The response of Iraqi Shia to the war was espe-
cially noteworthy. Shii opposition groups such as
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI) and the Daawa Party, which had been
forced into exile by Husayn’s government, hoped
that the regime would fall, but they did not want
to see their country destroyed by a full-scale war.
They also began to favor the creation of a more
democratic government. Shii leaders joined lead-
ers of secular Iraqi opposition groups in calling for
a popular uprising against Husayn during the war.
When it was evident that Iraq would be defeated,
these calls intensified. Further incitement for a
rebellion was provided by President Bush on Feb-
ruary 15, 1991, when he called on “the Iraqi mili-
tary and the Iraqi people to take matters into their
own hands” (Sifry and Cerf, 96). Their rebellion
actually started during the first week in March in
southern Iraq, quickly spreading to Kurdish areas
in the north. It included disaffected members
of the regular armed forces as well as civilians.
However, when it became evident that the UnitedGulf Wars 275 J