9:81–82, 48:16). Other quranic verses deal with
exemption from military service (Q 9:91, 48:17),
fighting during the holy months (Q 2:217) and
in the holy lands (Q 2:191), prisoners of war (Q
47:4), safe conduct (Q 9:6), and truce (Q 8:61).
The classical doctrine of jihad, developed
during the eighth and ninth centuries, delineated
between dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and dar
al-harb (house of war, i.e., those who did not
submit to Islamic rule). Islamic law presumed an
ongoing state of warfare between the two, except
for limited truces under specific circumstances.
Legal scholars defined who was obligated to par-
ticipate in jihad and who was a legitimate target
(noncombatants such as Women, children, and
the elderly were protected). A recognized Muslim
government could declare jihad for legitimate
reasons (defense or propagation of the faith),
but jurists generally agreed that not all Muslims
were required to go to war; a limited force could
perform the duty on behalf of others. Before
launching jihad, Muslims must offer unbelievers
the chance to submit to Islamic rule without fight-
ing, either by converting to Islam or by paying a
poll tax. Jihad was conducted only if unbelievers
refused to submit.
After the conquest era (mid-seventh century
to mid-eighth century), truce between Muslim
and non-Muslim states became the norm. Some-
times Muslims allied with non-Muslims against
other Muslim states. In fact, jihad has historically
most often been launched against other profess-
ing Muslims or else has been defensive in nature.
Governments used jihad to legitimize their reigns,
labeling opponents as apostates, rebels, or unbe-
lievers and thus legitimate targets for jihad. Jihad
during the modern era has been mostly an antico-
lonialist enterprise.
Jihad has not always meant actual warfare.
Since the 12th century, Sufis and others have
defined it from a spiritual point of view, refer-
ring to an individual’s inner struggle against
unbelief and sin or to society’s struggle to bring
Islamic community in line with God’s laws. Some
invoke a hadith in which mUhammad addressed
soldiers returning from battle: “You have come
for the best, from the lesser jihad to the greater
jihad.” When asked what the greater jihad was,
he replied, “The servant’s struggle against selfish
desire.” This pacifistic view is also supported by
a verse in the Quran (Q 22:78). Modernists often
argue that jihad is allowed only as defensive war-
fare or the foundation for Islamic international
law. They maintain that Islamic law is superior to
Western international law due to its venerable age
of 13 centuries, its humane principles, its founda-
tion in divine dictates, and its clear-cut notions of
just war and unjustifiable aggression.
Radical Islamists use jihad to challenge the
status quo, which they accuse of selling out to
Western dominance. After sayyid qUtb (d. 1966),
revivalists increasingly believed that society could
not be changed from within. Rather, the oppres-
sive secularist regimes must be brought down so
that true Islamic society could be established. By
defining Egyptian society as Jahiliyya (in a state of
ignorance), Qutb opened the door for declarations
of jihad against Muslim rulers who were perceived
as hypocrites for failing to establish proper Islamic
societies. Radical Islamic groups have recently dif-
ferentiated between the jihad against these rulers,
whom they call “the near enemy,” from Western
powers, including the United States, whom they
call “the far enemy.” They have also reinterpreted
Islamic law to justify terrorist attacks on individu-
als (including women and children) historically
excluded as targets and to avoid the restriction
that only a recognized Islamic government could
launch jihad.
See also colonialism; dar al-islam and dar al-
harb; islamism; martyrdom; terrorism.
Stephen Cory
Further reading: David Cook, Understanding Jihad
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Majid
Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Rudolph Peters,
K 398 jihad