The Economist July 10th 2021 Middle East & Africa 47
SouthSudan
Unhappybirthday
M
ostnationsareborninaflurryof
optimism.SouthSudanwasnodif
ferent.Aheadofitsindependencedayon
July9th2011,SalvaKiir,thecountry’sfirst
andonlypresident,promisedhispeople“a
just, equitable and prosperous nation”.
Unshackledfromitsformeroverlordsin
thenorth,thenewstatewouldbe“united
and peaceful” within three years, its
foundingfatherspredicted.
If any nation deserved some slack, it
was South Sudan. In the halfcentury be
fore it seceded from Muslimdominated
Sudan its people had known little but war,
famine and enslavement. A decade later,
however, South Sudan is neither just, nor
equitable, nor prosperous. Having scoffed
at those who suggested that it would “slip
into civil war as soon as our flag is hoisted”
in his independenceday speech, Mr Kiir
helped unleash one just two years later. It
claimed perhaps 400,000 lives before a
tenuous ceasefire in 2018.
The blame for South Sudan’s tragedy
does not rest only on the shoulders of its
leaders. The country’s Western backers,
particularly in America, were ludicrously
unrealistic about what a state created from
scratch, with little infrastructure or na
tional identity, could achieve.
Such was the naivety that, in the years
before independence, some American offi
cials took to handing out Milton Fried
man’s “Capitalism and Freedom” to war
lords preparing to swap their uniforms for
suits. Others took up roles advising the
new government on how to woo the for
eign investment that would surely follow.
The American advisers have since slunk
away. (One now runs a distillery in South
Carolina.) Most foreign investors, after all,
shy away from warravaged states. That
South Sudan is ranked the world’s sixth
hardest place to do business by the World
Bank and sits at the bottom of Transparen
cy International’s corruption index may
clinch the matter for any still wavering.
South Sudan’s leaders turned out to be
neither the cuddly humanrights champi
ons imagined by the American left, nor the
marketloving Friedmanites hoped for on
the right. Instead, Mr Kiir’s ruling Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement has proved
to be murderous, larcenous and incompe
tent, as even once supportive Western offi
cials now admit. “We veer between despair
and disgust,” says one.
Beyond the political elite, it is hard to
find many people who are better off than
they were before independence. Few have
seen any benefit from the country’s dwin
dling oil wealth. Humanitarian agencies
calculate that a South Sudanese girl is
more likely to die in childbirth than to
complete secondary school.
There are a few reasons for cautious op
timism. In 2018 President Kiir and his for
mer deputy, Riek Machar, agreed to a peace
agreement that more or less ended the
fighting between their respective tribes.
Mr Machar was reinstalled as first vice
president. Yet killing by ethnic militias
continues. Four aid workers have been
murdered in the past two months. Roughly
a quarter of the population is still being fed
by aid agencies; otherwise there would be
famine. The deal between the president
and his deputy is fragile. Should South Su
dan ever hold its first election (as it is sup
posed to do in December 2022), civil war
could easily reerupt.
Such a catastrophe could be averted.
Western diplomats and regional powers
hope to persuade both sides to strike a bar
gain whereby election losers are still grant
ed a share of power. This could be done by
rotating the presidency among ethnic alli
ances and guaranteeing vicepresidential
slots to losing parties. South Sudan is short
of many things, but not of vicepresidents:
it has five. A federal system may pacify dis
gruntled minority groups.
Such reform would happen only if the
president and his deputy, who both dream
of holding untrammelled power, were per
suaded to resign. That step might help
South Sudan avoid becoming a failed state.
Sadly, it seems most unlikely to be taken.n
N AIROBI
SouthSudan’sseconddecademaybeas
troubledasitsfirst
mated was “at least” $50m, was sufficient
to buy a fleet of RollsRoyces. That does not
include Tibiyo, a trust ostensibly held by
the monarchy on behalf of the people, but
which critics say benefits the royals. It con
trols tracts of land and, according to Free
dom House, has stakes in sugar, manufac
turing, property and other firms.
The king has defenders. “Every morn
ing I’m grateful to wake up and see that the
king is still on the throne,” says Andre le
Roux, a fourthgeneration (white) Swazi
who runs a timber firm, Montigny, and the
main business lobby. His worry is not the
monarch, who he says ensures stability,
but an “enterprisethrottling” civil service.
Neal Rijkenberg, the founder of Montig
ny, who was appointed finance minister in
2018, says the country is “surprisingly
democratic”. For example, the king must
get parliament to approve his budget and
must use his own money to pay for posh
cars, he argues. What about the 340m lilan
geni ($24m) annual stipend? That pays for
touristpleasing cultural events. And ap
pointing a princess to the cabinet? “There
are many children he hasn’t given jobs to.”
Mr Rijkenberg’s appointment, along
side others in a “cabinet of ceos”, was per
haps a sign of the king’s fears. Manqoba
Khumalo, the commerce minister, was
poached from CocaCola. “It’s like when
your mother asks you to do something, but
times a thousand,” he says. The king is
worried about youth unemployment, he
adds. “He didn’t articulate it as a political
threat but he probably sees it that way.”
Opponents argue that the king can nev
er be a reformer. “He makes it impossible
to run a state professionally, ethically and
efficiently,” says Wandile Dludlu of the
banned opposition party, pudemo. “There
is no clear distinction between private and
public resources.” Sibongile Mazibuko, an
other activist, argues that whereas the kill
ing of George Floyd in America was “a
white knee on a black neck, here it is a
black knee on a black neck.”
“Because it is out of the spotlight, Eswa
tini gets away with a lot,” says a former dip
lomat. There are just eight missions in the
country. After South Africa, on which Es
watini depends economically, the most
important may be Taiwan. Mswati’s gov
ernment is the last in Africa with which it
has diplomatic relations. That has resulted
in an upsidedown situation in which Tai
wan lavishes aid to maintain an autocratic
status quo while accusing China of being
on the side of prodemocracy activists.
The crackdown may quell protests for a
while. But it seems that the king’s popular
ity is waning. In 2015, according to Afro
barometer, a pollster, 79% of Swazis said
they trusted him. Earlier this year the share
was 50%. Large majorities said they sup
ported multiparty democracy and wanted
to choose their leader, suggesting a prefer
ence for, at least, a constitutional mon
archy. And the longer his regimesilences
Swazis, the more likely it is thattheywill
decide they do not need a king at all.n
The king with his bling