The Economist July 17th 2021 21
United States
Infrastructureyear
Joe Biden’s mystery train
“I
nfrastructure week”was one of the
triter gags of the Trump era: like Samu
el Beckett’s Godot, it was perennially
promised and never arrived. President Joe
Biden’s go at infrastructure investment has
started to acquire a similar feeling of inter
minability, with fitful progress and no leg
islative text since he announced his plans
more than three months ago. Fidgety
Democrats vow serious progress before
Congress decamps for its August recess. On
July 13th Chuck Schumer, their Senate lead
er, announced the headline cost of the
mammoth package being prepared:
$3.5trn. Delivering it will require deft and
perfectly executed legislative manoeuvres.
Back in April, Mr Biden packaged his in
frastructure ambitions differently. There
were to be two parts. One piece of legisla
tion would be devoted to “hard” infrastruc
ture—such as roads, bridges, broadband fi
bre, and water pipes—and climate: build
ing rehabilitation, an electricvehicle
charging network and other necessary in
vestments that the private sector was poor
ly placed to make. The second portion was
to be “human infrastructure” (the concept
has acquired a certain plasticity in Demo
cratic messaging). The striking compo
nents of this package included an expand
ed child benefit, universal preschool, paid
family leave, and hefty subsidies for child
care and community college. The hard and
the soft parts would each cost about $2trn,
and would be just about paid for (the White
House employed some artful accounting)
by raising taxes on wealthy Americans and
businesses, especially multinationals.
But Washington specialises in the
crushing of beautiful visions. Though
Democrats hold the White House and both
chambers of Congress, their narrow major
ities mean they must stick together to pass
legislation unilaterally, as with the presi
dent’s $1.9trn covid19 stimulus bill,
passed by reconciliation (a provision that
allows budget bills to circumvent the de
facto 60vote threshold in the Senate).
Since then, the moderate and progressive
factions of the party have become more
willing to exert their implicit veto powers.
Mr Biden’s response is another twopart
plan: a bipartisan bill focused on hard in
frastructure, without much in the way of
climate expenditures or compensating tax
increases; and a reconciliation bill stuffed
with everything else (the Big Bertha recent
ly announced by Mr Schumer).
Because of the filibuster, a bipartisan
bill, which moderate Democrats want,
needs ten Republican votes in the Senate.
The framework for such a compromise has
already been agreed on, though its size—
$579bn in new spending—is modest in
comparison to the president’s stated ambi
tions. Hence the second part of the plan:
stuffing the leftover policies into an im
mense omnibus bill. It will probably in
clude vast climaterelated expenditures,
trillions for the safetynet and tweaks to
the healthinsurance regime, all balanced
out by increased taxes that Republicans
have declared a nonstarter, and all passed
through budget reconciliation.
WASHINGTON, DC
The president’s agenda depends on somehow steering two trains at once
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