GOVERNMENT,MARKET AND COMMUNITY IN URBAN SOLID WASTE 275
still permeated by authoritarianism and reluctance on the part of the old establishment
to alter the power structure. Actual commitments to the idea of partnerships, therefore,
are few and seem to be motivated primarily by the desire to gain access to foreign
funds rather than a genuine belief in the potentials of partnering. In the absence of a
regulatory framework for partnering, the private-private arrangements that sprang up
in the city have collectively developed ‘regulatory rules’ and market-efficiency them-
selves. This is a difficult process, in which much can go wrong, as conflicts and lack
of trust among the firms show.
In Hyderabad, both political and administrative opposition to the transfer of traditional
public sector responsibilities to the market or civil society continues to be quite strong.
The country’s history of state-led development and the fact that many of its major
institutions (political parties, trade unions) are imbued with socialist ideas translates
into slow implementation of reforms that challenge the state’s leading role. This is
shown by the strong path-dependence of institutional reform, i.e. the difficulty in
adapting not only official rules and regulations, but also the mind set and capacities of
those responsible for implementing them (cf. Leach, Means and Scoones, 1999). The
partnership idea may be gradually gaining ground in Hyderabad, but at the same the
authorities clearly indicate that they want to remain firmly in the driver’s seat.
One also has to take the capacity of the public sector to properly fulfil its role in part-
nership arrangements into account. It is often claimed that privatisation requires the
‘guiding hand of the state’ to become effective (Batley, 1996; Post, 1999). When
responsibilities are passed on to the private sector, safeguards must be built in to
ensure appropriate standards, achieve coordinated provision, ensure a competitive
environment and avoid monopoly control of essential services by private providers
which are not publicly accountable, and to minimise corruption and inequity (Rond-
inelli and Iacono, 1996; Burgess et al, 1997). The move from direct provision to
co-ordinating and supervising private delivery implies that local bodies have to
completely reorganize and reorient their administrative machinery with much more
emphasis on contract management and performance monitoring. In addition, the entire
regulatory framework has to be modified to suit the new division of tasks and respon-
sibilities. In Nairobi these pre-conditions are certainly not fulfilled, and therefore no
adequate basis exists on the public side to develop partnerships with the private sector.
In Hyderabad the local state is much more competent and better equipped to
adequately discharge of its supervisory responsibilities. Although the first steps on the
privatisation track produced mixed results, the local body quickly learned from its
mistakes and adapted its role accordingly. The authorities have created a situation in
which private firms can operate efficiently and effectively. However, their desire to
keep everything under control also implies that the freedom of movement of private
partners is seriously curtailed.