30 JOHAN POST
the conclusion that services are delivered more efficiently than by municipal depart-
ments but tend to ignore the additional costs incurred by the authorities for contract
management and performance monitoring, not to mention aspects such as land acqui-
sition for disposal or transfer sites (Cointreau-Levine, 1994). Furthermore, it is often
necessary for the government to remain actively involved in service delivery, not only
for the pragmatic desire to keep in touch with operational reality and to have a fall
back position in case of private company failure, but especially while the (commer-
cial) private sector is interested only in servicing ‘profitable’ high-income and easily
accessible areas (Batley, 1996: 744).
Regarding the third aspect, the specific nature of public goods strongly determines what
kinds of private sector arrangements are feasible. The familiar classification of public
services ranges from purely public goods (also called collective goods) which are
consumed jointly and for which it is difficult to exclude people who do not pay (police,
fire brigade) to purely private goods which can be consumed by individuals and from
which people who cannot or will not pay for them can easily be excluded. In case of
collective goods contracting and concession are the most appropriate methods of
private sector participation. On the other hand, open competition is the most suitable
option for public goods that can be treated as private goods (Cointreau-Levine, 1994:
6-7). Different activities within the solid waste management system fall into different
categories. The sale of recyclables, for example, resembles a purely private good,
while the cleansing of major roads and public areas falls into the category of collective
goods. House-to-house collection of waste is positioned somewhere in between these
extremes. It has the nature of a so-called joint use or merit good, which means that the
service can be provided on the basis of people’s ability to pay. However, charging
rates on the basis of full cost recovery may incite many (poor) households either to
engage in free rider practices or to opt out of the service (with detrimental effects for
public health). Therefore, urban governments in many poor countries will be faced
with the continued need to spend substantial parts of their budgets on waste collection
services, and perhaps even be required to remain involved in its direct operation
(Batley, 1996: 730).
2.5. POLICY CONTEXT
The fourth dimension, the policy context, deserves some more attention. The unique
structure of political-economic forces and cultural attitudes to a large degree deter-
mines the perception of privatisation (favourable or unfavourable), the preferred type
of public-private arrangement (more or less control by the government) and the condi-
tions that require most attention (managerial capacities, limitation of investment risks,
community participation etc.) (Rondinelli et al., 1989). Despite strong rhetorical
support for privatisation the process moves at a very slow pace in most low-income
countries. Very often the preconditions for successful privatisation have not been
fulfilled, such as the absence of well-developed capital markets (in case substantial