58 S. GALAB, S. SUDHAKAR REDDY AND JOHAN POST
Due to the rapid growth and sheer size of Hyderabad final disposal is becoming a
major headache for the administration. The Golgonda site has been used for 20 years
and it was closed recently, in January 2000. The site got saturated and it was decided
to convert the land into a golf course under the State Tourism Department. Gandam-
gooda was partially closed in 2001 on the notice of the Andhra Pradesh Pollution
Control Board, as it reached its maximum capacity. Now 10 acres are handed over to
Selco International for its pelletisation plant (see note 4). The Mansurabad site is still
used for dumping although it has long passed its saturation level. Due to its remote
location transportation costs are a major worry, especially to the private contractors
with their tight contract specifications. There is ongoing protest from the public
against the continued use of the site and trucks now require police escort to safely enter
the place.
Currently, investigations are carried out into possible new sites. However, even if the
authorities are able to identify sites that are technically suitable for being used as dump
yards, vehement opposition is expected from the public, and names of potential sites,
therefore, were not disclosed. Another problem is that new dumps are likely to be
located outside MCH jurisdiction. Currently, two out of three are outside the MCH
area. Decision-making on the city’s SWC, therefore, depends on collaboration with
other administrative units, both neighbouring municipalities and the state government,
each bringing in their own political demands^14. The future location of dumpsites is
expected to become a heatedly debated and time-consuming issue. It is very likely that
future locations will be at considerable distance from Hyderabad and that transporta-
tion costs will become an increasingly troublesome item.
A system-wide concern of entirely different dimension relates to local politics. The
early experiments with privatised SWC were severely troubled by practices of corrup-
tion and nepotism. Fortunately, local civil society is sufficiently empowered to expose
the excrescences of these infractions. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that offi-
cials are bribed to be lenient, for example when private contractors flout contract spec-
ifications. Such practices, to be found at all levels within the local bureaucracy,
continue to affect service efficiency and effectiveness in a negative way. The rigidity
of the unit system, for example, partially results from the desire to minimise opportu-
nities for abuse. At the same time it prevents the MCH from benefiting more from the
acclaimed flexibility and dynamism of the private sector. A similar effect is due to the
persistent interference of the powerful labour unions, most of which have tried to
obstruct privatisation of SWC (see chapter 5). Although they have achieved to protect
the interests of organised (municipal) labour, they have done little to support the
newcomers in the business. Furthermore, they force the MCH into the utilisation of
their own relatively expensive labour force, making SWM much more expensive than
- The MCH continues to rely on the state for covering an important part of its expenses, giving the latter
a major (indirect) say in all decision-making.