82 MOSES M. IKIARA, ANNE M. KARANJA AND THEO C. DAVIES
The NCC has a larger fleet of vehicles than any of the private companies but most of
these are not operational because of inadequate maintenance and repair.
Workforce and productivity
One of the principal causes of the financial crisis that perpetually characterises the
NCC is its bloated workforce. The growth of population in the city has often been used
as a scapegoat for hiring more workers, basically relatives, friends and supporters of
councillors and politicians (NCC, 2000). The increase in the workforce has, however,
not been accompanied by increasing performance of municipal services. Between
1995 and 2000, for instance, NCC workforce increased from 17,000 to 20,048 but this
did not improve the Council’s solid waste collection service. The cleansing section
had about 2,324 workers in 1998, 22 percent of them involved in solid waste collection
and the rest in street cleansing (JICA, 1998). At the time, the NCC was collecting
about 70 tons of SW per day, implying that 7.3 workers were required to collect 1 ton.
A private company like Bins (Nairobi) Services Ltd. required only 0.62 workers,
however, while a smaller company like Tacentac Enterprises required 0.84 workers
Moreover, the NCC had an average crew of 4.8 per collection vehicle compared with
4.0 for private collectors (JICA, 1998). A good demonstration of private companies’
superiority in terms of labour productivity is the experience of the pilot public-private
arrangement between the NCC and KRH. With Kshs 1.3 million (US$ 20,000) per
month, the private firm was able to do much better work than NCC used to do with
more resources. The municipal authority was able to re-deploy 525 waste workers and
vehicles to other areas, and save Kshs 2.6 million per month (excluding fuel and
vehicle maintenance costs; Moyo, 1998).
The bloated NCC workforce has had immense implications on the wage bill. More
than 90 percent of NCC’s annual income is used to meet personnel emoluments,
leaving less than 10 percent for operations and maintenance (NCC, 2000). According
to the Interim Oversight Board, a sizeable proportion of NCC workers are “ghost”
employees (they exist on the payroll only) and only about 12,000 are required. Obvi-
ously, this phenomenon is another reason for the comparatively low labour produc-
tivity for NCC operations. Unfortunately, recommendations to reduce the workforce
to 12,000 in order to improve the revenue position of the NCC meet with fierce oppo-
sition. NCC councillors, for example, raised a fury when 273 irregularly employed
workers were sacked in January 2001.
Despite problems related to the spontaneous nature of the privatisation process in
Nairobi, official policies increasingly admit to the potentials of the private sector (cf.
the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 2000-2003, the Republic of Kenya,
2000). Moreover, the Interim Oversight Board strongly supports the idea and recom-
mends that NCC’s role should change to that of supervision, contract management,
and monitoring of private contractor performance. The Board has also unveiled a plan
to improve the financial position of the NCC. The plan is hinged upon improvement