Chapter 10Contracts for the supply of goods and servicesThe test applied by the court is whether a reasonable
person would regard the goods as being unsatisfactory.
There had been some doubt under the old standard of
merchantable quality whether goods commonly used
for a number of purposes had to be fit for all such pur-
poses. In M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment Cov
Lupdine Ltd(1987) the Court of Appeal held that the
definition of merchantable quality required goods to be
suitable for one or more (but not all) purposes for which
they were commonly bought. The Law Commission re-
commended that goods of a particular description and
price should be fit for all common purposes. This re-
commendation is given effect by s 14(2B), which requires
goods to be fit for ‘all the purposes for which goods of
the kind in question are commonly supplied’. A buyer is
not obliged to examine goods before he buys them and,
if he chooses not to do so, he will still be entitled to full
protection under s 14(2). The buyer can lose his right to
complain in two situations: first, where the seller spe-
cifically points out that the goods are faulty; secondly,
where he decides to check the goods, but fails to spot an
obvious defect (s 14(2C)).Fitness for a particular purpose
Section 14(3) provides that where the seller sells goods
in the course of a business and the buyer, expressly or by
implication, makes known to the seller any particular
purpose for which the goods are being bought, there is
an implied condition that the goods supplied are rea-
sonably fit for that purpose, except where it can be
shown that the buyer has not relied – or that it would be
unreasonable for him to rely – on the seller’s skill and
judgment. If the buyer specifies the particular purpose
for which he requires the goods (e.g. shoes suitable for
running in a marathon), the goods must be suitable for307Bramhillv Edwards(2004)The claimants, Mr and Mrs Bramhill, bought a second-
hand ‘Dolphin’ motor home from Mr and Mrs Edwards,
which Mr Edwards had imported from the United States.
The legal width for motor homes in the UK is 100 inches
but the Dolphin was 102 inches wide. The Bramhills had
used the Dolphin for six or seven months when they
measured its width and found it was 102 inches. They
spoke to Mrs Edwards about it and she wrote back to
say that they had been allowed to import the vehicle into
the UK and the width would have been checked as part
of the process. The Bramhills continued to use the vehicle
for another four months when Mr Bramhill wrote to com-
plain about the width, and over the next three months
he tried unsuccessfully to get Mr Edwards to take the
Dolphin in part-exchange for another motor home.
During this time he received an opinion from the Vehicle
Inspectorate that the Dolphin did not comply with UK
regulations and its use could lead to prosecution. The
court had to consider: (i) whether the Edwards had mis-
represented that the Dolphin complied with UK regula-
tions as regards its width; (ii) whether the Dolphin was of
satisfactory quality under s 14(2A); (iii) if the Dolphin was
in breach of the implied term in s 14(2A), whether the
Bramhills had lost their rights under s 14(2C) because
they had inspected the vehicle before buying but they
had not noticed that its width was unlawful; and (iv) what
the measure of damages should be. The Court of Appeal
held that the judge’s decision that there was no misrep-
resentation was not perverse. It found that there was no
breach of the implied term as to satisfactory quality. A
reasonable buyer would be aware that there were a
significant number of over-size vehicles on the roads
and the authorities were turning a ‘Nelsonian’ blind eye
to breaches of the width regulations. There was also
evidence that it would be possible to insure the vehicle.
Even if the vehicle had been in breach of s 14(2A), Mr
Edwards would have had a defence under s 14(2C) as
the examination of the vehicle should have revealed that
it was over-size. Furthermore, even if there had been a
breach of the implied term, the Bramhills would not have
been entitled to damages because they were aware of
the breach of the regulations long before they took any
action to rescind the contract in reliance on it.If you buy goods second-hand or very cheaply, you
cannot reasonably expect the highest standards of quality.
Bartlettv Sidney Marcus Ltd(1965)The claimant bought a second-hand car from the defend-
ants who were car dealers. The claimant was warned
that the clutch was defective and he agreed to a reduc-
tion in the price of the car to take account of this. The
defect turned out to be more serious and, therefore,
more costly to repair than he expected. He claimed that
the defendants were in breach of the implied term as to
quality. The Court of Appeal held that in the circum-
stances the car was of merchantable quality. As Lord
Denning MR pointed out: ‘A buyer should realise that
when he buys a second-hand car defects may appear
sooner or later.’