autonomy. The notion of relational character (in
respect of persons) is not logically incompatible
with the notion of personal autonomy. Those who
think differently on this suppose that there is an
antithesis between the two—that is, the individual
and society. Perhaps it is undeniable that the
organic character of the community as held in
African social thought and practice is more pro-
nounced, the interpersonal bonds between per-
sons much stronger. Consequently, community life
is real, becoming the focus of the activities of the
individual members. From this phenomenon,
some scholars have concluded that the relational
character of persons is so excessively stressed and
its limits pushed to such extremes that the social
role and status of the community in African social
thought are augmented, resulting in the diminish-
ing of the status of the individual person who, in
the sequel, is bereft of initiative, personality iden-
tity, and originality. Individuality, it is erroneously
supposed by others, is smothered by communality.
Conceptually, communality cannot be opposed
to individuality because, after all, the well-being
and success of the group would depend on the
unique qualities of its individual members—that is,
on the intellectual abilities, talents of various kinds,
characters, dispositions, shareable experiences, and
so on of each individual person. If communalism
were to fail theoretically to provide free rein for the
development, full realization, and exercise of the
individual’s unique qualities, it would be an incon-
sistent social theory because it would, as it were, be
sawing off the branch on which it was going to sit.
However, communalism, as conceived and under-
stood in Akan or African social philosophy, is a
consistent theory, one that is not opposed to the
fundamental interests of the individual. To partici-
pate in communication activities that would
enhance one’s own good as well as the good of oth-
ers is surely not to have one’s identity and person-
ality submerged or ignored by the group.
In the communal social order, it is impossible
for the individual to feel socially lost or insignifi-
cant; on the contrary, the individual feels socially
worthy and important as his or her role and activ-
ity in the community are appreciated. The individ-
ual also benefits materially from the good will of
members of the group.
Let us consider, to begin with, the ideas
expressed in the following wisdom fragment:
“The clan is like a cluster of trees which, when
seen from afar, appear huddled together, but
which could be seen to stand individually when
closely approached.” This fragment has been
explained in the following way: “If one is far
away from a cluster of trees, he sees all the trees
as huddled or massed together. It is when he goes
nearer that he recognizes that the trees in fact
stand individually. The clan (group) is just like the
cluster of trees.” The fragment gives the impres-
sion that the community or group is a mere
abstraction, a mental construct, not a reality. This
is not so, however, because the cluster of trees is
real, implying that the community is a reality,
although this does not mean that its reality takes
precedence over the reality of the individual. The
fragment makes it clear that individuality cannot
be diminished or subverted by the reality of the
community or social group. The fragment implies
further that the individual has a separate identity,
and that, like the tree, the individual is separately
rooted, possessing an autonomy and uniqueness.
Just as the tree is not in any way sucked up by the
cluster, although some of its branches may touch
those of other trees (thus the relational character
of the individual trees), so the individual is not
in any way absorbed by the cluster, that is, the
community.
Individuality is well understood in Akan social
thought as seen in the well-known Akan fragment,
“the clan (group) is merely a multitude” (crowd:
abusua ye dom). The fragment does not reject the
reality of the group as such, but it stresses the idea
that the individual cannot always depend on the
clan or the group for everything, but should try to
be independent and be responsible for him- or
herself. The fragment is thus intended to deepen
the individual’s sense of responsibility for him- or
herself. Thus, it repudiates social parasitism,
which is also rejected in the popular Akan saying,
“Life is as you make it” (obra ne woara abo). The
“you” here is, of course, the singular pronoun.
The meaning of the saying is that it is not the
group that will organize one’s life for him or her
despite the assistance that one may get from other
members of the group. It is the individual who, in
the final analysis, should strive for his or her inter-
ests, welfare, and happiness. There is no sugges-
tion in Akan thought, however, that the individual
should practice ethical egoism.Personhood 525