Easton (1979) are considered. He states that ‘political system’ is a
purely analytical concept which can be applied to any collection of
entities the theorist finds convenient. He then suggests the possibility
of the system responding to ‘input’ from the outside ‘environment’
by ‘outputs’ which in turn may affect the environment so as to stabi-
lise it. In such a case a stable ‘homeostatic’ system has been achieved.
However, such an outcome is by no means inevitable – the problem
then is to know when such an analysis is appropriate, and when a
breakdown of the system might occur.
Thus many writers now claim to be adopting a ‘system’ approach,
but it is often unclear whether they believe that political systems are
observable entities, analytical frameworks, useful analogies or a
problem-solving device.
By way of contrast, let us consider a more recent and perhaps
trendier group of political scientists – the ‘rational choice’ theorists
(or as we will usually refer to them, the ‘economists’). They have
adopted an alternative approach which, instead of starting with the
behaviour of whole societies, focuses on the behaviour of individual
political ‘actors’. Mainstream economists have analysed markets
starting with the behaviour of individual consumers and entre-
preneurs who are assumed to rationally pursue their own interests
(maximise utility or profit). The behaviour of individual voters,
bureaucrats or legislators can be considered in the same way (Downs,
1957; Tullock, 1965; Himmelweit et al., 1985). As with economics, it
is not asserted that all actors are rational. The assumption is only that
the system functions on the basis that most actors will be rational,
and that irrational actors will cancel each other out/go ‘bankrupt’, etc.
(Nor does maximising utility exclude the proposition that some
actors will derive utility from altruistic actions.)
As an example of this approach, the behaviour of bureaucrats is not
seen in constitutional terms as giving impartial policy advice to
minister’s, or in functional terms as part of both the interest-
aggregation and rule-enforcement functions. Their behaviour is
described as seeking to maximise their agency budgets in order to
maximise their own power, salary and prestige. An alternative
example is voters who vote in their own self-interest, rather than
what they might objectively think is best for the country as a whole.
Both examples stress the importance of ‘economics’.
POLITICS 17