eVorts to reduce global starvation. It remains unclear whether those who
defend an ambitious application of Habermasian ideas to the global arena
have suYciently answered these practical questions (Zolo 1997 ). On a more
systematic level, applying Habermas’ basic normative vision to the global
arena also potentially undermines one crucial claim for its intellectual super-
iority vis-a`-vis competing approaches. As noted above, Habermasians suggest
that republican and participatory democratic models of decision-making
unrealistically exaggerate the necessity of relatively direct forms of small-
scale, face-to-face political exchange. But does not their model require an
equally dramatic politicization of the (global) citizenry? Deliberative democ-
racy in this account calls for a substantial quantitative increase as well as
qualitative improvement to existing forms of political deliberation. Closer to
republican and participatory democratic models than probably acknow-
ledged, deliberative democracy demands a vast increase in participation
and diYcult old-fashioned ‘‘political work,’’ since deliberation itself is obvi-
ously a form of participation. Revealingly, Benhabib speaks of ‘‘participation
in deliberation,’’ notwithstanding her attempts to contrast the deliberative
model favorably to competing ones (Benhabib 1996 , 70 ; Hauptmann 2001 ). In
fact, deliberation is an especially time-consuming and fragile form of par-
ticipation, since it requires tremendous patience, a rare willingness to hear
others out, and the careful evaluation of often ambiguous assertions and
claims. The achievement of meaningful transnational deliberation is likely to
be at least as arduous and demanding in terms of the scarce resource of time
as many other transnational political endeavors.
Not surprisingly, many Habermasian deliberative democrats hesitate be-
fore embracing this radical interpretation of deliberative democracy. Other
elements of Habermas’ account oVer a ready basis for a fall-back position.
Unfortunately, those elements pave the way for an unsatisfactory account of
transnational democracy.
Typically, the audacious normative model underlying the demand for
deliberative democracy is quickly translated into the institutional demand
for ‘‘a plurality of associations,’’ or ‘‘interlocking net of... multiple forms
associations, networks, and organizations’’ constituting ‘‘an anonymous ‘pub-
lic conversation’ ’’ (Benhabib 1996 , 73 – 4 ). Although formal institutions are
both necessary for the protection of deliberation and are expected to codify its
results via binding general laws, the real site for creative political deliberation
remains a decentered civil society characterized by a multiplicity of associ-
ations. Benhabib favorably contrasts this pluralistic model of ‘‘anonymous’’
96 william e. scheuerman