For Berlin, this freedom and recognition for self-deWnition in a plural
society is not solely for individuals, but for groups as well. As with individ-
uals, what oppressed classes or nationalities want ‘‘is simply recognition (of
their class or nation, color, or race) as an independent source of human
activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with
it... and not to be ruled, educated, guided, with however light a hand, as
being not quite fully human, and therefore not quite fully free’’ (Berlin 1969 ,
156 ). This focus on group autonomy has been taken up by multicultural
pluralists looking for a liberal justiWcation for group diVerence and self-rule.
Both Galston ( 2002 , 124 ) and Tully note the relationship between demands
for recognition and demands for forms of group autonomy. Tully ( 1995 , 6 )
argues that multicultural demands for recognition ‘‘share a traditional polit-
icalmotif: the injustice of an alien form of rule and the aspiration to self rule
in accord with one’s own customs and ways.’’ Similarly, for Raz, multicul-
turalism ‘‘emphasizes the role of cultures as a precondition for, and a factor
which give shape and content to, individual freedom’’ (Raz 1994 , 163 ). Such
struggles are struggles for liberty, autonomy, and self-rule—certainly endur-
ing characteristics of liberalism. 4
Berlin would have agreed. As Gray ( 1996 , 62 ) points out, while freedom is
the central liberal value for both individuals and groups in Berlin’s theory, the
claims of freedom can never be absolute; it is reasonable, within a pluralist
framework, to trade oVliberty for other values, or to trade oVsome types of
liberty for others. This is what makes Berlin’s form of the liberal–plural
interface so unique and imaginative. The acknowledgment of, and the real
space for, the incommensurability and the diversity of various goods draws a
strong contrast to other liberal theories (such as in Rawls and his followers)
based in universal theories of justice or fundamental rights (Gray 1996 , 145 ).
The point of Berlin’s pluralism is that we need to make choices in liberal
systemswithoutthe kind of overarching, singular, universal rules at the heart
of most liberal theory. He is unwilling to lay out a theory with such a
universal right to liberty, given the pluralist context liberalismWnds itself
within. Berlin, then, expands both the pluralist and liberal imagination in
arguing for a politics with room for the underlying support for diVerence in
each. He embodies the argument for a tense compatibility between liberalism
and pluralism.
4 See both Galeotti and Spinner-Halev in this volume for more on these themes.154 david schlosberg