themselves as clarifying the normative principles that underpin policy pro-
posals. From Rawls and Dworkin onwards, work on principles of justice and
equality has carried deWnite policy implications regarding taxation, public
expenditure on health, the treatment of those with disabilities, and so on.
While it has rarely been possible to translate the theories into speciWc
recommendations (Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market and Amartya
Sen’s theory of capabilities are often said to be especially disappointing in this
respect), they are undoubtedly directed at public policy. Normative reasoning
applied to public policy largely deWnes the content ofPhilosophy and Public
AVairs, though this reasoning involves moral philosophy as much as or more
than political theory. 9 Political theorists working on questions of democracy
and representation have also drawn direct policy conclusions regarding the
nature of electoral systems or the use of gender quotas to modify patterns of
representation (Phillips 1995 ).
Policy evaluation and design are important parts of the public policy sub-
Weld, and both require normative criteria to provide standards by which to
evaluate actual or potential policies. Again, political theory is well placed to
illuminate such criteria and how one might think about handling conXicts
between them (for example, when eYciency and justice appear to point in
diVerent directions). It is also well placed to explore the discourse aspects of
public policy, an aspect that has been an especial interest of the Theory,
Policy, and Society group of the American Political Science Association.
Among the linkages this group develops are those between deliberative
democratic theory and policy analysis, between the logic of political argu-
ment and interventions by analysts and advocates in policy processes, and
between interpretive philosophy of social science and policy evaluation
(Hajer and Wagenaar 2003 ).
Cutting across all the sub-Welds of political science in recent decades has
been rational choice theory, grounded in microeconomic assumptions about
the wellsprings of individual behavior. Indeed, to some of its practitioners,
rational choice is what should truly be described as political theory. For these
practitioners, rational choice theory is ‘‘positive’’ political theory, value free,
and geared toward explanation, not prescription. This claim does not hold
up: as explanatory theory, rational choice theory is increasingly regarded as a
failure (Green and Shapiro 1994 ). But many believe that it is very useful
nevertheless. Game theory, for example, can clarify what rationality isin
9 See the compilations of Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon ( 1974 a, 1974 b, 1977 ); also Goodin ( 1982 ).introduction 29