John B.Goodman and Louis W.Pauly 297national decisions. Our cases do not enable us to reach definitive conclusions in
this regard, but it seems likely that these differences in timing are correlated with
broader variations in domestic political structures. Whether a country is facing
chronic capital inflows or outflows may depend upon the structure of the state
and the relative strength of domestic interest groups. But the fundamental
convergence in the direction of capital mobility noted in all of our cases suggests
that systemic forces are now dominant in the financial area and have dramatically
reduced the ability of governments to set autonomous economic policies.
Our argument and evidence do not suggest, however, that a movement back
toward capital controls or analogous policies to influence the flow of capital is
impossible, only that such a movement would be more costly from a national
point of view. Indeed, the restoration of controls is not just a theoretical possibility.
In the midst of the European currency crisis in September 1992, for example,
Spain and Ireland imposed new controls on banks’ foreign exchange transactions.
Despite the fact that such “temporary” measures did not contravene the letter of a
prior agreement to eliminate impediments to capital mobility throughout the
European Community, they surely conflicted with its spirit. More generally,
continuing instability in global currency markets did subsequently lead the G-7,
at the urging of American treasury secretary Nicholas Brady, to commission a
new study to explore multilateral approaches to dealing with the consequences of
international capital mobility.
If our argument is correct, two theoretical as well as policy implications bear
underlining. First, if pressures for capital decontrol are now deeply embedded in
firm structure and strategy, any efforts to understand or deal with the political
effects of short-term capital mobility would seem to entail dealing with the politics
of foreign direct investment. The two issues have long been related, but have also
long been viewed as distinguishable for conceptual as well as for policy purposes.
The distinction has broken down. The adoption of policies to influence short-
term capital flows would now have a clearer impact on long-term investment
decisions. Further research on this deepening connection is warranted.
Second, if policy convergence on the issue of capital controls is intimately
linked to the development of international financial markets, attempts to understand
and manage the effects of short-term capital mobility cannot be divorced from
efforts to enhance the cross-national coordination of financial policies. As the
negotiators at Bretton Woods recognized in 1944, open and stable markets ultimately
depend upon a modicum of shared behavioral norms. Despite deepening
interdependence across contemporary financial markets, states retain the right to
change their policies on capital movements, either individually or on a regional
basis. What remains unclear is their obligation to take into account the consequences
of such policies for other states and for the world community. Thus, the time may
now be ripe to begin considering new international arrangements to define and
demarcate national responsibilities in an age of global markets.