Cletus C.Coughlin, K.Alec Chrystal, and Geoffrey E.Wood 317reelection will most likely respond to the demands for protectionist legislation of
such an interest group.
The empirical evidence also suggests that the adverse consumer effects of
protectionist trade policies are not short-lived. These policies generate lower
economic growth rates than the rates associated with free trade policies. In turn,
slow growth contributes to additional protectionist pressures.
Interest group pressures from industries experiencing difficulty and the general
appeal of a “level playing field” combine to make the reduction of trade barriers
especially difficult at the present time in the United States. Nonetheless, national
interests will be served best by such an admittedly difficult political course. In
light of the current Uruguay Round negotiations under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, as well as numerous bilateral discussions, this fact is
especially timely.
REFERENCES
Hickok, Susan. “The Consumer Cost of U.S. Trade Restraints,” Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Quarterly Review (Summer 1985), pp. 1–12.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Diane T.Berliner, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Trade Protectionism in
the United States: 31 Case Studies, Institute for International Economics (1986).
Krugman, Paul R. “Is Free Trade Passé?” Journal of Economic Perspectives (Fall 1987),
pp. 131–144.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Costs and Benefits of
Protection (1985).
Tarr, David G., and Morris E.Morkre. Aggregate Costs to the United States of Tariffs and
Quotas on Imports: General Tariff Cuts and Removal of Quotas on Automobiles, Steel,
Sugar, and Textiles, Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission
(December 1984).
World Bank. World Development Report 1987, Oxford University Press (1987).