Ronald W.Cox 373policy of bolstering a Salvadoran government that was facing an economic and
political crisis.
Opponents of the regional trade agreement included domestic firms that stood
to lose the most from reducing tariff barriers, especially the domestic textile and
clothing industries tied to the national market. An examination of congressional
debates over the content of CBI reveals that business nationalists also had some
influence on the final legislation. The American Textile Manufacturers Institute
and the American Apparel Manufacturers Association joined with the American
Clothing and Textile Workers Union and the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union to lobby Congress, especially the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
Ways and Means Committee, to maintain import restrictions. These business
nationalists and their labor counterparts succeeded in excluding all textile and
apparel products from the duty-free provisions of CBI....
AUTO FIRMS AND THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The U.S. automobile industry has developed a corporate production strategy that
seeks to combat the effects of increased global competition. An important pillar
of the strategy is regionalization of production along continental lines. This
regionalization has proceeded along three general dimensions, involving: (1) moving
phases of the production process (including the fabrication of engines and
transmissions) from the United States to lower-wage sites in Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina, with Mexico becoming a preferred location since the 1980s; (2)
developing a North American production scheme characterized by knowledge-
based or lean production in order to better compete with Japanese rivals for the
U.S. market; and (3) lobbying for a NAFTA agreement that extends preferential
treatment to North American producers in Mexico....
By the late 1980s, U.S. firms increasingly looked to Mexico as a preferred site
for relocation of motor vehicle production for the U.S. market, including the production
of auto parts, engines and transmissions, and finished motor vehicles. A number of
factors converged to make Mexico especially attractive to U.S. producers. First, the
Mexican government implemented a series of trade liberalization measures that
facilitated and encouraged U.S. transnationals to export more finished motor vehicles
and auto parts. Second, the Mexican state implemented neoliberal reforms that have
resulted in a devaluation of the peso and a reduction in wages in the auto industry
and elsewhere, making Mexico more attractive to foreign investors. Finally, U.S.-
based auto firms have been able to take advantage of Mexico’s proximity to the
United States, which has given them a cost edge over European and Japanese
competitors in the production of parts and finished vehicles for the U.S. market.
This combination of Mexican incentives and corporate interests has already
resulted in dramatic increases in U.S. foreign direct investment in auto parts and
assembly in Mexico....
At the same time, U.S. firms have asked for dual rules of origin requirements
that extend preferential treatment to U.S. firms and discriminate against new entrants