428 Inflation and Stabilization
factors account for the variance. It nonetheless appears plausible that politics had
at least an intervening effect on policy choices and outcomes.
In Thailand, the new political order ushered in by parliamentary elections in
1979 might be labeled semidemocratic. In 1980, General Kriangsak was forced
to resign over economic mismanagement in the face of rising protest and pressure
from within the military. Another general, Prem Tinsulanon, was elected by a
large majority in both houses to replace him. Prem moved to incorporate opposition
parties into a broad-based coalition, yet to Thailand’s “bureaucratic polity,” power
continued to reside in the army and bureaucracy. There were no fundamental
discontinuities in business-government relations and technocrats even gained in
influence.
In South Korea, General Chun Doo-hwan’s handpicked successor, Roh Taewoo,
was forced to widen the scope of political liberalization and constitutional reforms
in the wake of widespread urban protests in 1986 and 1987 that included students,
workers, and middle-class elements. Running against a split opposition, Roh captured
the presidency with just over one-third of the popular vote. Though the conservative
ruling party subsequently lost control of the National Assembly and has been
forced to make a number of economic concessions, including those to labor and
farmers, the executive and bureaucracy maintain comparatively tight control over
fiscal policy.
In the Philippines, Aquino was brought to power by massive middle-class
demonstrations against fraudulent elections in February 1986. The “revolution”
did not rest on popular sector mobilization; indeed, the left made the tactical
error of not supporting Aquino’s presidential candidacy. Subsequent
development planning focused greater attention on rural problems in an effort
to counteract the insurgency, and the government pursued a mild Keynesian
stimulus through a public works program. But Aquino also moved quickly
to cement ties with those portions of the private sector disadvantaged by
Marcos’ cronyism and Aquino’s economic cabinet was dominated by
businessmen-turned-technocrats. The reconvening of Congress in 1987
provided new opportunities for pork-barrel politics, but as in Thailand and
Korea, fundamental political and institutional continuities limited political
pressures on macroeconomic policy.
More generally, in those countries where underlying class and sectoral cleavages
are less intense, or where class and sectoral cleavages have been muted by integrative
forms of party organization, the political stakes of stabilization appear lower. This
has two further implications. First, the capacity to carry out stabilization programs
in these cases is not closely influenced by the type of regime. Democratic
governments in Venezuela and Colombia have done as well or better at maintaining
fiscal discipline as systems dominated by one party such as Mexico.
Second, where the parties are less polarized and the process of political succession
is institutionalized, changes of government should not be expected to produce
major shifts in policy. In such crises, unlike in high-conflict societies, newly elected
governments do not usually represent previously excluded groups that expect
immediate material payoffs. The time horizons of political leaders are therefore
likely to be longer.