252 No god but God
revolution had fought to attain—while simultaneously affirming the
Islamic character of the new republic.
In some ways, Iran’s new constitution did not differ markedly
from the one written after the country’s first anti-imperialist revolu-
tion in 1905, except that this constitution appeared to envisage two
governments. The first, representing the sovereignty of the people,
included a popularly elected president who would serve as the execu-
tive of a highly centralized state, a parliament charged with creating
and debating laws, and an independent judiciary to interpret those
laws. The second, representing the sovereignty of God, consisted of
just one man: the Ayatollah Khomeini.
This was the Valayat-e Faqih that Khomeini had been writing
about furtively during his years of exile in France. In theory, the Faqih
is the most learned religious authority in the country, whose primary
function is to ensure the Islamic quality of the state. Yet through the
machinations of Iran’s powerful clerical establishment, the Faqih was
transformed from a symbolic moral authority into the supreme politi-
cal authority in the state. The constitution provided the Faqih with
the power to appoint the head of the judiciary, to be commander in
chief of the army, to dismiss the president, and to veto all laws created
by the parliament. Originally intended to reconcile popular and
divine sovereignty, the Valayat-e Faqih had suddenly paved the way
for the institutionalization of absolute clerical control.
Still, Iranians were too elated by their newfound independence,
and too blinded by the conspiracy theories floating in the air about
another attempt by the CIA and the U.S. embassy in Tehran to
reestablish the Shah on his throne ( just as they had done in 1953), to
recognize the dire implications of the new constitution. Despite warn-
ings from the provisional government and the vociferous arguments
of Khomeini’s rival ayatollahs, particularly the Ayatollah Shariat-
madari (whom Khomeini eventually stripped of his religious creden-
tials despite centuries of Shi‘ite law forbidding such actions), the draft
was approved in a national referendum by over 98 percent of the elec-
torate.
By the time most Iranians realized what they had voted for, Sad-
dam Hussein, encouraged by the United States and furnished with