when civil (negative) liberties are infringed by democratic
decisions. We may limit liberties if a majority so decides or con-
strain majority decisions if this is necessary to protect liberty, but
we should not claim that we are maximizing or effecting trade-offs
in respect of one value. A plurality of values are at stake here. But
Rousseau is clear that one who participates in assemblies which
make the law is not subject to alien impositions, which subjection
is a clear infringement of liberty. Rousseau is surely right – and it
is worth recalling the obvious but neglected point that those who
possess such legislative powers have the opportunity to take part
in (are not hindered in their pursuit of) an activity which they
independently value – as clear a manifestation of Berlin’s negative
liberty as any.
Natural liberty, the liberty of the independent soul who fashions
a life for herself in conditions which do not require any interaction
with others, is lost. In its place, individuals have acquired a
strengthening of their moral liberty and a protected sphere of civil
liberty through the exercise of political liberty which the
opportunity for democratic participation yields. But the second
natural value which is concomitant with independence is equality.
In what way is that preserved under the constitution of the
democratic republic?
Equality, too, has three dimensions for Rousseau. First, let us
look at political equality. The citizen who has political liberty, the
power of participation, insists that this be equal political power.
‘Men become everyone equal by convention and legal right.’^10 Each
has one vote to contribute in the decision-making process. Since
political power is equal, no one is dependent on the power of
others, nor do they have others dependent on themselves. Equality
of political power and political liberty reinforce each other. No
one is enslaved by inequities of political power, neither seeking to
enslave others nor being vulnerable to the ambitions of others for
political mastery.
A second kind of equality is necessary for democracy to work
well – rough equality of material possessions. In the Discourse on
Inequality, Rousseau had demonstrated the corrupting effect of
divisions of rich and poor. Such divisions corrode liberty through
the effects of patterns of dependence within the economy. Inevit-
ably, an unequal distribution of wealth will transform itself into
DEMOCRACY