consumers express with respect to them, and preferences are sig-
nalled by willingness to pay as signalled by questionnaires and
opinion polls where no money changes hands. ‘Shadow prices’ are
worked out for goods, like the Brent Geese and medieval churches,
which do not have a market price.
I am persuaded by critics of these methods that the enterprise is
misguided, particularly in respect of environmental goods. From
my study window in the centre of Glasgow I can see the mountains
of the Isle of Arran, fifty miles away, whenever there is some north
in the wind. Fifty years ago, factories cast a smokescreen over the
city which was dispersed only rarely, on Sundays and public
holidays. My life is better for the view – but how can that be
quantified?^50 I conclude (after too little argument) that when
utilitarianism abandons the assumptions of a providential history
and gets down to the brass tacks of policy appraisal using the
techniques of welfare economics, it is likely to fail here, too.
There may be a middle road – of common-sense evaluation of
outcomes in terms of an objective list of values that we are used to
comparing and trading off in familiar dilemmas.^51 This will have to
be worked out in detail. We can properly reserve judgement on the
success of the utilitarian enterprise, even as we keep in mind its
systematic contribution to the problems of political philosophy.
UTILITARIANISM