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25:5); or else a forced sale of property through poverty, when the next-of-kin of the
original proprietor may redeem the land (Leviticus 25:25). It is evident, that the former
must be regarded as a duty, the latter as a privilege attaching to kinship, the object of
both being precisely the same, the preservation of the family (rather than of the
individual) in its original state. But although the law does not mention them, the same
principle would, of course, apply to all analogous cases. Thus it might, for example, be,
that a man would marry the widow, but be unable to redeem the property. On the other
hand, he never could claim to redeem property without marrying the widow, to whom
as the representative of her dead husband the property attached. In any case the property
of the deceased husband was vested in a childless widow. In fact, so long as the
childless widow lived, no one could have any claim on the property, since she was
potentially the heir of her deceased husband. All authorities admit, that in such a case
she had the use of the property, and a passage in the Mishnah (Yebam. iv. 3) declares it
lawful for her to sell possessions, though it does seem very doubtful whether the
expression covers the sale of her deceased husband's land. Such, however, would have
been in strict accordance with the principle and the spirit of the law. In the case before
us then, the property still belonged to Naomi, though in reversion to Ruth as potentially
representing Elimelech and Machlon, while the claim to be married to the next-of-kin
could, of course, in the circumstances, only devolve upon Ruth. Thus the property still
held by Naomi went, in equity and in law, with the hand of Ruth, nor had any one claim
upon the one without also taking the other. No kinsman had performed the kinsman's
duty to Ruth, and therefore no kinsman could claim the privilege of redemption
connected with the land. With the hand of Ruth the land had, so to speak, been
repudiated. But as the kinsman had virtually refused to do his part, and Naomi was
unable to maintain her property, she disposed of it, and that quite in the spirit of the law.
There was no wrong done to any one. The only ground for passing the land to a
kinsman would have been, that he would preserve the name of the dead. But this he had
virtually refused to do. On the other hand, it was still open to him to redeem the land, if,
at the same time, he would consent to wed Ruth. It would have been the grossest
injustice to have allowed the privilege of redeeming a property to the kinsman who
refused to act as kinsman. Instead of preserving a name in Israel, it would in reality
have extinguished it for ever.
This was precisely the point in discussion between Boaz and the unnamed kinsman.
Boaz brought, first, before him the privilege of the kinsman: redemption of the land.
This he accepted. But when Boaz next reminded him, that this privilege carried with it a
certain duty towards Ruth, and that, if the latter were refused, the former also was
forfeited, he ceded his rights to Boaz.^336 The bargain was ratified according to ancient
custom in Israel by a symbolical act, of which we find a modification in Deuteronomy
25:9. Among all ancient nations the "shoe" was a symbol either of departure (Exodus
12:11), or of taking possession (comp. Psalm 60:8).^337
(^)