for controlling the bureaucracy grew. The more that groups outside the state,
in business, agriculture, the labour movement, and the professions developed
and produced their own organizations, the more the bureaucracy was further
held accountable to other groups of policy-makers.
However, the political power of the bureaucracy is not necessarily
matched by administrative competence. It frequently has to work with inad-
equate information, particularly statistical. The fact that it monopolizes
policy-relevant knowledge does not mean that it will have the quantity of
skilled manpower for the tasks allotted to it. It may be reluctant for political
reasons to complete projects started under the preceding political leadership
(Milne, 1972). Riggs argued long ago that the greater the political power of
the bureaucracy, the weaker the incentives for effective administration and
the more ineffectual the bureaucracy. He also claimed that efficiencyvaried
inversely with the weight of bureaucratic power, largely as a result of the
imbalance between bureaucracies and other political institutions and the
consequent preoccupation among bureaucrats with furthering their bureau-
cratic interests rather than serving political masters (Riggs, 1964). The
administrative capacity of Third World states is of current concern to inter-
national agencies such as the World Bank which are trying to redefine
the role of the state in economic and social development.
Riggs also found historical and contemporary evidence to support the
conclusion that bureaucratic power and expansion had adverse conse-
quences for the development of political systems. The merit system, repre-
sented most strongly by bureaucratic recruitment methods, undermines one
of the strongest supports of an emergent party system, namely the ‘spoils’
of office. Bureaucratic centralism and control of local governments weaken
the educative effects of political participation. The bureaucratic mobiliza-
tion of interest groups weakens centres of autonomous political pressure.
Parliamentary legislative institutions cannot thrive on a foundation of weak
parties, pressure groups and popular participation. Bureaucracies rather
than parliaments control revenue raising, expenditure and policy initiatives.
Bureaucratic ‘formalism’, whereby laws are enacted but not implemented,
further undermines representative institutions. The judicial system, lacking
popular support, can be exploited by the bureaucracy to assist its abuse of
power. Riggs concluded that ‘too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy when
the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective
politics ... separate political institutions have a better chance to grow if
bureaucratic institutions are relatively weak’ (1963, p. 126).
The bureaucracy can positively discourage the development of institutions
which can ensure accountability and function as alternative policy-making
162 Understanding Third World Politics